-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (2/3) ==================================== Issued for October 2026. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2 * vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-3 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of November 2026. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. 11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete procedures for canary verification is included here. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ None. Canary Verification Procedures ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. To verify biergaizi's signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 2. To verify persmule's signature... a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described below. b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2. Note that, to import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not work. c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid E-mail address, "Kikek "). Its sole purpose is allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys. d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key. Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly. e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by persmule's key can now be verified as usual. 3. To verify vimacs' signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Esther Rantzen dies aged 86 Girl, 3, found dead at Surrey home Counter-terror police investigating Iran-backed firebombing Man dead and boy in critical condition after double stabbing in skate park Ministers to announce crackdown on foreign political donations $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml Rivals in Israel Election Strike Tone of Triumph, but Outcome Is Far From Clear Live Updates: At Least 10 Killed in Train Collision in Spain, Officials Say Israels President, Isaac Herzog, Faces a Difficult Choice The Ocean Was the Color of Chocolate. Mexico Declares War on Seaweed Rare Wartime Dissent in Moscow Over Plans to Dismantle Russias Eiffel Tower $ date -R -u Wed, 28 Oct 2026 10:38:20 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEsY1MEu5fcQ/m5BMbMrsT3Dj0NxoFAmrh0KQACgkQMrsT3Dj0 Nxpn5w//Xp5hoP48SlkkHGdyPKV2NaqEiwP0CWNI+RDluEhYIss2zE0v18QKrhw6 cDX83HTAljSKhAX+WyEgDcWLWhPl7IIy8paZ0YzcYn9sjnyuHProc2YXpNTl/BEz Wos1LJKgPs1ce1/Swo8uNN1HOq+5GG3Je8brUA0IvcLOHf2Rj3UpEgXZldP/3z/3 6RfrIUSKm1bmnk+0SUWyANXzY+OkiXwxUcdmhH35aW+30XfhdOpyjKsDGsW+RieV tY/OQBZgYGlkXKa37l2W5HCn1IXDB3Cb3Wnppw0TucZXZmSMbzFSt3QEN6JgJy9Q fDRM8F+F0dkqdj6QtGUpSD9PMkmH93pIe3UjsmTgispxGGIVPOpFyX8jBfEin75H nfAHa8VC5EfjgCalRXVHgN/2JJ0biAoTMCvvjS+PAcyinlwGbfZaw/60KTweMlDr 9fuLhJW045LQAFr9xqjKk0qRkkjQMmoXr3EcL8UpmNBtoB+MuYw2IIFf3S3Y09zQ 1WHKYr9tYzx83QWug6NhLEc5kbN9bzgMTgzmmrrkSKKyAgVAFb6gOq1xAhn9Vfh5 HD1Y3EBKw63z0077/UYThgNVo1JhJUwG62/SCbc9BWQA8uq0M7u14qoMQIuPXFRI GMp6wpBULHzGCRWisC1H8Qwh3wIkkoUmWWkaKrj4VvPk8QR8NGA= =Jo9U -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----