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blug-canary-3 [2019/11/23 08:57] – Wu Delinblug-canary-3 [2026/10/27 09:54] (current) – vimacs
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 ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ======
  
-<code> +<code>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----+
 Hash: SHA512 Hash: SHA512
  
Line 8: Line 7:
 ==================================== ====================================
  
-Issued for November 2019.+Issued for October 2026.
  
 Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
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 * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
-* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 +* persmule : 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2 
-* wnereiz  : 0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72+* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
  
 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.
Line 63: Line 62:
  
 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
-weeks of December 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published+weeks of November 2026. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
 by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.
 +
 +11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
 +verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
 +procedures for canary verification is included here.
  
 Special Announcements Special Announcements
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  
-1. Since mid-October, persmule's old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has +None.
-expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, has been +
-created and uploaded to https://keys.openpgp.org/, it can be obtained from +
-this keyserver.+
  
-2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary +Canary Verification Procedures 
-documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency.+
  
-3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. +1. To verify biergaizi's signature...
-This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above +
-were valid, and are still valid.+
  
-4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns +    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as 
-within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's personal User-ID has +    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint 
-not published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver. Instead, only +    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.
-cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any +
-User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without +
-User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, as a result, it's not possible +
-for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule.+
  
-5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best +    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.
-option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. +
-As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by +
-biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing +
-their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately +
-by them as valid.+
  
-6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces +2. To verify persmule's signature...
-the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet.+
  
-7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is +    a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published 
-resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this +    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using 
-would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive +    the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without 
-persmule's signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to +    User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described 
-ensure no data tampering has occured.+    below.
  
-8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz's signing keys are unchanged, +    b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, 
-but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the +    such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The 
-canary document for clarity.+    fingerprint is 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2. Note that, to 
 +    import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver 
 +    website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a 
 +    technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not 
 +    work.
  
-9. When new information is available, it will be published in the "Special +    c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped 
-Announcements" section in future warrant canary documents.+    that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid 
 +    E-mail address, "Kikek <othar7ok@ep2quey.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is 
 +    allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys. 
 + 
 +    d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from 
 +    https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key. 
 +    Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's 
 +    now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly. 
 + 
 +    e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by 
 +    persmule's key can now be verified as usual. 
 + 
 +3. To verify vimacs' signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as 
 +    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint 
 +    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. 
 + 
 +    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.
  
 Proof of Freshness Proof of Freshness
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 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
- Iran's internet blackout: What is happening, and why did the government turn it off? + Esther Rantzen dies aged 86 
- Pictures of the Day: 23 November 2019 + Girl, 3, found dead at Surrey home 
- Colombia protests: President Duque imposes curfew in Bogota to shut down unrest + Counter-terror police investigating Iran-backed firebombing 
- Strictly Come Dancing's Anton du Beke says he would welcome same-sex pairings + Man dead and boy in critical condition after double stabbing in skate park 
- Sacha Baron Cohen hits out at social media 'propaganda'+ Ministers to announce crackdown on foreign political donations
  
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
- The Jungle Prince of Delhi + To Work With P.O.W.s, Ukrainians Suppress Feelings About the Enemy 
- The Broken Promise of a Panda: How Pragues Relations With Beijing Soured + Egypt OKs Military Aid to Saudis in Fight With Houthis 
- Would-Be Chinese Defector Details Covert Campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan + Serbias Election Shows New Vulnerability for Nationalist Populists 
- Israelis Call Netanyahu Indictment an Earthquake, but Agree on Little Else + Israeli Jews Across the Spectrum Face an Election of Fears 
- The World Burns All Year. Are There Enough Planes to Douse the Flames?+ Lula Defeats Bolsonaro for Brazil Presidency, in Blow to Latin Americas Right
  
 $ date -R -u $ date -R -u
-Sat, 23 Nov 2019 08:55:34 +0000+Tue, 27 Oct 2026 09:53:39 +0000 
  
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
  
-iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/nkFgy0Or5D/NPDHQYQFAl3Y9C4ACgkQr5D/NPDH +iHUEARYKAB0WIQRlsdhNDMVQSujfnGCovW2B2flWVAUCauB0sQAKCRCovW2B2flW 
-QYSCUBAAkNAoyik1JwUhiqWHZppGfXjK381EJS8xFvxPGn+UN+wsHKfq/jw8yO6i +VKlFAQCluJi3vVXfB58qV4tdF4bxpa4fgH/toxpgOMj9+Mtp5wEA7eCh9XPI2Rhv 
-IQ3eoYp6n5/L1mEXYgnAs8YlCxOd4ofaNZi0pfw9HSgSee1zbOUPNjraKS9oZrDC +9wb+UNxRYF47Kf8GgDU25pHluNFktgU= 
-zkz5wTVe1kuwm3dsusoatsPli9c2XhOaGmD0zDA6sfL5jNN+Zhf91m9RQs79nSy7 +=3IU2
-GsX+8qylhuYuEmJTkBW070tL2njNIcpjt4VA5rlxvz2fvjaIiyG03UVJ3NIAfecV +
-NFIuEXEi0IdogQ3SqmEFwSa8cK/z34mS9D2apc7x3gkBc9Bw+/SRJ5HSULsLEMtZ +
-/JK85YblrS4IlioBe8czqbgw9GWMfFgaTEov3M0s4gYVkXx+JAnMxtxtzfkvKWwO +
-64LMglIcsk58V9s6b4H3EFojafBWCf6mJP8tvU3HVsVzN1CeRXTOgEBR9mrCFCy3 +
-XuQkvtsBGAMhyXd7aez2n5MEgWg0fn67hwauhVFxbmIJxW6gwtaqQP5SyfjUscoN +
-E8/LZxSNQlgoEljl92QzjBxBHhbrWh6ntsAkGxVzpZlWqAaLE3hZb3tHPI+bpnQL +
-a1tsBy9skLR3ALVq618zVY0dCBANrsjN4id0u1dRZNFvBBOy/fkbMrTZ84tFq74r +
-aDXGBklgZC4akOpbqGg9qO14Jer0c3jCcUtkDaTidCjNHdsQN8k= +
-=Myog+
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 </code> </code>
  
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