Archives of historical canaries can be found at:
https://github.com/beijinglug/warrant-canary
If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3)
====================================
Issued for March 2025.
Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct!
Signers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
* persmule : 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2
* vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.
You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next
one is located at:
* https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2
It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time,
but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated
by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time.
Statements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our
entire system is sound.
2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach,
to our best knowledge.
3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys.
4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or
information leakage to a third party.
5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations
from any authorities, whether formal or informal.
6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar
orders from the government of the People's Republic of China.
7. We have not received any government subpoenas.
8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened.
9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
"Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.
10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
weeks of April 2025. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.
11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
procedures for canary verification is included here.
Special Announcements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
None.
Canary Verification Procedures
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. To verify biergaizi's signature...
a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.
b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.
2. To verify persmule's signature...
a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published
the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using
the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without
User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described
below.
b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver,
such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The
fingerprint is 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2. Note that, to
import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver
website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a
technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not
work.
c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped
that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid
E-mail address, "Kikek <othar7ok@ep2quey.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is
allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys.
d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from
https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key.
Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's
now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly.
e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by
persmule's key can now be verified as usual.
3. To verify vimacs' signature...
a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403.
b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.
Proof of Freshness
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
Heathrow accused of colossal failure over fire shutdown
Heathrow forced to shut down because of net zero
Woman jailed for tricking partner into thinking she was pregnant with twins
Ukraine: The Latest - the worlds most trusted and award-winning podcast on the war
Listen: The tech boss who was Russias secret spy
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
In Myanmar, Earthquake Aftershocks and Airstrikes Terrorize Residents
After Bangkok Building Collapse, Fearing High-Rises
Marine Le Pen Could Be Banned From France Election if Shes Found Guilty of Embezzlement
Prince Harry Accused of Bullying by Chair of Charity He Co-founded
Hegseth Pledges to Step Up Military Cooperation With Japan and Deter China
$ date -R -u
Sun, 30 Mar 2025 16:28:15 +0000
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