This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.
Both sides previous revision Previous revision Next revision | Previous revision Next revision Both sides next revision | ||
blug-canary-1 [2019/09/30 17:37] BLUG Admin |
blug-canary-1 [2020/04/29 03:48] BLUG Admin |
||
---|---|---|---|
Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
==================================== | ==================================== | ||
- | Issued for September 2019. | + | Issued for April 2020. |
Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | ||
Line 23: | Line 23: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | * biergaizi: | + | * biergaizi: |
- | * persmule : 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 | + | * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 |
- | * wnereiz | + | * wnereiz |
THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | ||
Line 62: | Line 62: | ||
8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | ||
- | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrent | + | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant |
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | ||
" | " | ||
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | ||
- | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrent | + | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant |
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | ||
10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | ||
- | weeks of October 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published | + | weeks of May 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published |
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | ||
Line 76: | Line 76: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | None. | + | 1. Since mid-October, |
+ | expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, | ||
+ | created and uploaded to https:// | ||
+ | this keyserver. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary | ||
+ | documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two | ||
+ | documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. | ||
+ | This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above | ||
+ | were valid, and are still valid. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns | ||
+ | within the community, as a countermeasure, | ||
+ | not published to the https:// | ||
+ | cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any | ||
+ | User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without | ||
+ | User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, | ||
+ | for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best | ||
+ | option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. | ||
+ | As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by | ||
+ | biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing | ||
+ | their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately | ||
+ | by them as valid. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces | ||
+ | the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is | ||
+ | resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, | ||
+ | would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive | ||
+ | persmule' | ||
+ | ensure no data tampering has occured. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz' | ||
+ | but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the | ||
+ | canary document for clarity. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 9. When new information is available, it will be published in the " | ||
+ | Announcements" | ||
Proof of Freshness | Proof of Freshness | ||
Line 82: | Line 124: | ||
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | Al-Shabaab claims twin attacks on US base and EU convoy in Somalia | + | How does a coronavirus antibody home test kit work, and how do I get one? |
- | Top City lawyer took advantage of ' | + | These are the NHS workers who have died from coronavirus |
- | Donald Trump suggests Democrat leading impeachment inquiry should | + | What is coronavirus, how did it start and how big could it get? |
- | Afghanistan election dispute looms as front-runners both declare victory ahead of results | + | When will the UK lockdown next be reviewed? |
- | | + | How many coronavirus cases are in your area? Use our tool to find out |
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | Gems, Warlords and Mercenaries: Russias Playbook in Central African Republic | + | Spain, France, Greece: Coronavirus World News Live Updates |
- | Hong Kongs Status as Neutral Ground at Risk as China Asserts Power | + | Coronavirus Diplomacy: How Chinas Red Cross Serves the Communist Party |
- | | + | Where Theres a Will in England, Theres |
- | | + | |
- | Xi Extols | + | War Within War: As Saudi Prince Edges Away from Yemen, His Allies Feud |
$ date -R -u | $ date -R -u | ||
- | Mon, 30 Sep 2019 17:34:43 +0000 | + | Wed, 29 Apr 2020 03:46:26 +0000 |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
- | Version: GnuPG v2 | ||
- | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAl2SPNEACgkQ+tPrBeiO | + | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAl6o+J0ACgkQ+tPrBeiO |
- | jW3IBw//co+P9zFGAtkTKTKXtp7qxTNuss/g3fBn7WA91EeSaU2OClkSxfL57fY0 | + | jW3bhxAAkKYBfvq8Q/lY0iOkWIcZ3haiK0FTjQ7cZ7QB3iOmlrJBtYOMjb58U8Ni |
- | /e2YHcH+e8IFhaLQOzeviSRSozb7YfjepSXGeboD96WBJpwn1pDlZ5X2symZJlbD | + | Q0KVKVsrS7a4OaZHXr7QON9OX03IuAK47g7GF6aRRcVZ3WMLKrMfkqgXS2VZywow |
- | teTfmm/vtiVW+QgHRnLItibii4aBfbaa7ITWzHrBltKbCJkP+ZGWwCVYULv1pyML | + | F5iQjxYZrRd/OX8H82WpTLHdyo7w9XVZz4vjM9bIrx8X/QQSbgFAE54vbuhrhhDJ |
- | kZ9cRlhII35K2TxXsLNjI3Yoq8dVyoSnrsPaSckknVeoeU2QdWH1nNP6cQ0nVqs8 | + | u/1ZuJYYYmPbkita9SChMVaJVZcR2FFpxXiM4+jE1LPnh/5moU1r2OY/ |
- | PNVKFuR9RcHRK1b57beT/XfFqwJwE7sUV0FSLdRYRlAkJHH5tQ5/ | + | gvC36ICo8GLgYgI3l9CxT3wq3efuYSoKe8fiLnky2ZxVqKtfD8qVtG+Cy8aBZWeA |
- | G2noZmFQCSGoxQ4ccOJEGWWEaxQ1Qp7w6WIUOsubWc2yUeGQTcOAvvKff8DbskGF | + | R0aJ2mNdGMbNKqWgEBxKY5zQ3BjV5/ |
- | YoYonEcipAx1pyb1ljMHHK0Dw/ | + | cNfay6nchRu90VZDtQV0TaAd1FD/8dARDTW5WicEm1q36yqiUGM0SagxYybeR86k |
- | QnliYVGsYSKuYL2W7/fyDR9DxmLljbjUWoiJWI2hebunFVIPHfkDfL9YgAJMPI6v | + | d3Z9gI1izIKhk4vv8B4g0r5IyrbqNyh02ROioW4KjMMQ59GzOz8wXru1+EKBVPJQ |
- | 6zNiiWm/ | + | Hjn9O0gjUu1eRfykHjBYqJw/suRwaVRvZIo57A9OypeeENd8bbUZc9mCKHi7DPc5 |
- | noRF5vwCo+rbgb2AZzWzAcpB4pn7CF4T/ | + | Tc3cdAANelHiSScwd9RFsXnr55I4wzV008vKXj4pGHruSky57l6PK8LxEZMgW6Hu |
- | FyXBmxMLF0nVFKmY6AdirI7FZtuQ36ajLiQk1cP2EC31gEcJ030= | + | 308WYyX33rMWrukJHr890ENAPPJFr8YMDKztvAeKiJZcpRS+UAM= |
- | =Qx/8 | + | =7ffR |
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
</ | </ |