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blug-canary-1 [2019/10/30 16:29] BLUG Admin |
blug-canary-1 [2019/11/30 15:50] Tom Li |
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==================================== | ==================================== | ||
- | Issued for October | + | Issued for November |
Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | ||
Line 23: | Line 23: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | * biergaizi: | + | * biergaizi: |
- | * persmule : 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 | + | * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 |
- | * wnereiz | + | * wnereiz |
THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | ||
Line 62: | Line 62: | ||
8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | ||
- | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrent | + | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant |
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | ||
" | " | ||
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | ||
- | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrent | + | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant |
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | ||
Line 76: | Line 76: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | None. | + | 1. Since mid-October, |
+ | expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, | ||
+ | created and uploaded to https:// | ||
+ | this keyserver. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary | ||
+ | documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two | ||
+ | documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. | ||
+ | This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above | ||
+ | were valid, and are still valid. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns | ||
+ | within the community, as a countermeasure, | ||
+ | not published to the https:// | ||
+ | cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any | ||
+ | User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without | ||
+ | User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, | ||
+ | for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best | ||
+ | option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. | ||
+ | As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by | ||
+ | biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing | ||
+ | their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately | ||
+ | by them as valid. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces | ||
+ | the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is | ||
+ | resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, | ||
+ | would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive | ||
+ | persmule' | ||
+ | ensure no data tampering has occured. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz' | ||
+ | but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the | ||
+ | canary document for clarity. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 9. When new information is available, it will be published in the " | ||
+ | Announcements" | ||
Proof of Freshness | Proof of Freshness | ||
Line 82: | Line 124: | ||
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | Grenfell Tower: Dany Cotton refuses to resign after damning report demands | + | London Bridge attack: Usman Khan was studentand personal friend of Anjem Choudary |
- | Halloween 2019: How Celtic trick-or-treating and Gaelic turnip-carving led to the American celebration | + | 'A beautiful spirit who always took the side of the underdog': London |
- | Clutha helicopter crash caused by pilot taking 'a chance' | + | Cyprus farmers warn of halloumi shortages over EU protection plans |
- | | + | |
- | | + | Crossbow killer, 51, who shot his heavily pregnant ex-wife in 'evil' |
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | Vietnamese Migrants Sought | + | Students Fainting From Hunger in Venezuelas Failing School System |
- | Grenfell Tower Inquiry Criticized for Faulting Fire Brigade | + | For Filipino Seafarers, |
- | Militants Kill 5 Laborers in Kashmir, Expanding Threat to Civilians | + | How an Anti-Brexit London District Could Help Boris Johnson Triumph |
- | An H.I.V. Outbreak Puts Spotlight | + | Spains Leftist Outsiders Are on the Verge of Getting Inside |
- | Britain to Hold Election | + | Stabbings Around London Bridge Kill 2 in Terrorist Incident |
$ date -R -u | $ date -R -u | ||
- | Wed, 30 Oct 2019 16:28:27 +0000 | + | Sat, 30 Nov 2019 15:48:22 +0000 |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
Version: GnuPG v2 | Version: GnuPG v2 | ||
- | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAl25ulEACgkQ+tPrBeiO | + | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAl3ij1UACgkQ+tPrBeiO |
- | jW3mVw/9F1LMoODRWmEIQeD5VPIWJwwp33Rt53WuYIBCA2yK1dtLKWj+fO8tBkq8 | + | jW1ePA/7B0KjWXQU6bMlzrh9HggghVmRMju6d0Ox43UYa2jAKkG/ |
- | rLAwBcL4JFgAcdqJT6SpB/GC8XukKgXFiIJjvHfRhXt6ZefMvAbaJDJ44dRKQx5k | + | EZQu6HCTvUTJ3sygxWzJDapTM/ |
- | eokxlbsLhvBqksa3BP0EF+1wRwMZghe09YXY64wm+ebEb+SjWkFblYEhk4KvVBoO | + | ABPWJFWgEnJK42E/BTqHPirOPOaD1XOcbsqw8NCrKmqt4ijR8SD3JsTJRZS6EtKw |
- | cNDdK7rsGLoh1B4qt2N2W4WES9NJaFqHqy+iafYRbZya9pa/zHBFSK+cRDxioZsi | + | sYjSvwdFOv3SBza0nrCiOxisb2Pq48S5jk0LVCcod8i1hvVG1v9kSupzQJGMuswp |
- | X51U60Ntt50rq+nEtoH4qqIQYcSZ1PMPkmkkF7M/VQ3lhzQownv6fYRhq/jeyz0a | + | SItYWz9JogO7s1V3GTn2rTp8kNtzo3QBINXU0dMv8o++rz1dwP1K9jh3E1LP3kNX |
- | fW7Bmfl9SaJTeTcegPjrh/v+yUL5PC7ZjjsXIEVNS0L3SaNatVnxuVC0HvcXziZa | + | dbEMC8FRUFbKi9psL+LVHkchrdWJ9lIOUJy/6mUKc9+xlNkqyBLQHZI930qF4hYZ |
- | BPsWjv6qBbQBCVjSkv0yU6zfXlNAzGRhJLXXTSulraEs0hUoeIsdC8IbQ2KkvXSt | + | nY6KF0UsBlEan8BJEF2CjJ8pM9JkuQH33Ek9jtNDZoC1OAH0YUJSDyhkCthW6NDT |
- | cySvJw85UZSyCJCJ+AQdJ8Hbg+4OvhRB2trT1skmRUZeKL9aM0XEB3ByXIBmBf+q | + | o1DcFPZ/BaaBOooGtg9i/Hb81o0Rsft8atzPOyJH8DaNp2MD2dA7Sz2yWJG6yDAL |
- | +zsDLTylDwSLRIaoGHFTXJRKUzV1AAr6KWfq0WitX5aAILKEBm/ | + | kAi7ZOMSndxthpvvNbBobCKU9brCQzkNeL/0ZJS+nBkhqWwNilnp/ |
- | 7B4SmUM4Ame6CdVDcOjjPD8FZkRxvTzcsFB7jGEMMrQMVQJCdJr/ | + | 7SFkXX7ZBY8qhQsDr7QHx0IWJitpwABFqfVZ1Wy8RCz9LGaEa1U84bu3cdaUVNjC |
- | 5abIthywfFa3mIWL2GDcc8inYFPOGFUbaiaPUBrjuqTYPdpV1H8= | + | qmc89M6GblgJXSQOeTCaspcuWR+x4VGuOX8mOzBs65tmmsm4YY0= |
- | =RMwa | + | =7+YM |
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
</ | </ |