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blug-canary-2 [2019/08/23 04:27]
persmule
blug-canary-2 [2020/02/21 02:10]
persmule
Line 8: Line 8:
 ==================================== ====================================
  
-Issued for August 2019.+Issued for February 2020.
  
 Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
Line 16: Line 16:
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  
-* biergaizi: 0xFAD3EB05E88E8D6D +* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D 
-* persmule : 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 +* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 
-* wnereiz 0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72+* wnereiz 0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72
  
 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.
Line 55: Line 55:
 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened.
  
-9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrent canary+9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
 documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
 "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
 NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
-again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrent+again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
 canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.
  
 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
-weeks of September 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published+weeks of March 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
 by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.
  
Line 69: Line 69:
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  
-None.+1. Since mid-October, persmule's old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has 
 +expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, has been 
 +created and uploaded to https://keys.openpgp.org/, it can be obtained from 
 +this keyserver. 
 + 
 +2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary 
 +documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two 
 +documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency. 
 + 
 +3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. 
 +This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above 
 +were valid, and are still valid. 
 + 
 +4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns 
 +within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's personal User-ID has 
 +not published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver. Instead, only 
 +cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any 
 +User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without 
 +User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, as a result, it's not possible 
 +for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. 
 + 
 +5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best 
 +option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. 
 +As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by 
 +biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing 
 +their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately 
 +by them as valid. 
 + 
 +6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces 
 +the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. 
 + 
 +7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is 
 +resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this 
 +would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive 
 +persmule's signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to 
 +ensure no data tampering has occured. 
 + 
 +8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz's signing keys are unchanged, 
 +but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the 
 +canary document for clarity. 
 + 
 +9. When new information is available, it will be published in the "Special 
 +Announcements" section in future warrant canary documents.
  
 Proof of Freshness Proof of Freshness
Line 75: Line 117:
  
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
- Family of UK Hong Kong consulate worker reject 'made-up' report about arrest over prostitution + US intelligence chief replaced 'after clash with Donald Trump over Russian bid to boost re-election' 
- Mother arrested after child found dead in caravan inBirmingham + Windrush draft report that called Home Office institutionally racist 'was watered down' 
- Brazilian president hits out at criticism over Amazon fires as Macron warns of 'international crisis' + Grace Millane killer sentenced to life in prison in New Zealand for murder of British backpacker 
- 'Worthless' sculpture from BBC'Fake or Fortune is actually priceless Giacometti worth more than 500,000 + Regent'Park mosque stabbing: man in his 70s attacked during prayers 
- Cannabis oil too expensive to prescribe to epileptic children on NHS, advisory body finds+ Thursday evening news briefing: Stabbing in London mosque
  
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
- With Amazon Ablaze, Brazil Faces Global BacklashLungs of the Earth Are in Flames + Coronavirus Live UpdatesClusters in Japan May Hint at How Virus Spreads 
- Massacred at Home, in Misery Abroad, 730,000 Rohingya Are Mired in Hopelessness + Far-Right Shooting Shatters an Already Fragile Sense of Security in Germany 
- South Korea Says It Will End Intelligence-Sharing Deal With Japan, Adding to Tensions + A Police State With an Islamist Twist: Inside Hifters Libya 
- Israeli Airstrike Hits Weapons Depot in Iraq + U.S. and Allies Blame Russia for Cyberattack on Republic of Georgia 
- Bold WomenScandalized ViewersIts Sex and the City, Senegal Style.+ Suspect Arrested in Stabbing at London Mosque
  
 $ date -R -u $ date -R -u
-Fri, 23 Aug 2019 04:20:36 +0000+Fri, 21 Feb 2020 02:01:48 +0000
  
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
  
-iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEfpRElbj/BG3RcF+YQmooAO3Wsm0FAl1faoQACgkQQmooAO3W +iQEzBAEBCgAdFiEEwonfPqgFyacM7J3iwYAPuUJ74CEFAl5POx0ACgkQwYAPuUJ7 
-sm36zQ/+JtxdjWA+ChBi/TDNOZEx87aYIsBUnh0hVqPlGBBvhorv87mV4vl4AQhQ +4CFEBAgAzvltWGMHElouFtnWIfb5EU0LL9Zlfhg2V8KZ/fe+bL6mKw1H9gxwTo08 
-ssES0INFM+tjHqJeaCh/YOc0jUamXHxyuEtxGUKS7GAJM85i06nogSsrYpp/pKzo +oi+GBRYQz8l4AVU1YTDO2aZNUYATIxsiBhFAEpGe1xoh3ui/9bZbUAtMZBHfoHK3 
-QCk1h1F8agtXGLHmUG88P8mx+SQ9iD+xhy8S8gs8XRtWyQ2esK8rApVsDO5JCLnv +ff6UnbfbHZOWUyfh03UNllZ3cdVBzQ9c64LrFlPmu2zNaif2/QTvESOpuDfNwRoR 
-fkbyawNQ+wBjBfrDvlEkr6KcTvfOP7FocVW/aWoGh10uwfM48cGUZFAfRdDMqOuL +CDsOg434SMB5T8mruLDy7NPyqey+03BpkhEMalskn6ra8FQWmct7q2xVfkB5HRhy 
-kUxhmOnD7/IoBnJPXBnnznJDV/B57h4zqdeEq4Fp0RJ1IfgwZGbHs4yzUG2NJTgD +l4SGWGNI8eE9+atyH/wKM46Ytdx0zgBCHQ95yeWa4kwAn6EP9kYMEqMRCSAdHauW 
-wGVY4BmwvUEYuVzpuHUrQTHMaqK3mTFtnSU0ITd3w0f3tuwsHzC8SHvj0UvRwPGH +Mp4GAH94izVkxwDQ6R7X9o2WdmZh7w=
-jVI9oprH2LMjATZ7YmdjgleVYP9Dx2Cj+ICaCYd6XbbwCjB7PCbUILDnMqjtN+Bg +=1OSg
-1VkpXdaf9KVkvK/rXG0ibKPy/lQOtnjO0rZffa9u3ftrU3cZMwpNtFyYPARZCXUX +
-jQ2dDcyYcTlP6pKUIhavv+/nJWcHJI+E9lriML9X5S5O9R7cZdgaZdSuPUmXtMuB +
-i5GKOOa2DauA5nn2+81Dd/SAyLAS+wlrzNFFUE1DEoyXa9hJL/+75AQRjXoLDMSa +
-AdevBN6C84e/lcQi0EX2jci6qQXswSytbI/d1TLo816UKbt+QpI+
-=ldAe+
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 </code> </code>
blug-canary-2.txt · Last modified: 2024/03/31 15:06 by persmule