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--- blug-canary-2 [2019/09/30 17:44]
BLUG Admin old revision restored (2019/09/20 01:52)
+++ blug-canary-2 [2024/01/17 11:44]
persmule
@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (2/3) ======
 <code>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
@@ Line 8: / Line 6: @@
 ====================================
-Issued for September 2019.
+Issued for January 2024.
 Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
@@ Line 16: / Line 14: @@
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-* biergaizi: 0xFAD3EB05E88E8D6D
+* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
-* persmule : 0x2987A25DAC8454A5
+* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
-* wnereiz  : 0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72
+* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.
@@ Line 55: / Line 53: @@
 . Our personal safety and security is not threatened.
-. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrent canary
+. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
 documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
 "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
 NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
-again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrent
+again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
 canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.
 . We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
-weeks of October 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
+weeks of February 2024. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
 by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.
+. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
+verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
+procedures for canary verification is included here.
 Special Announcements
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-None.
+. We've found a workaround for importing keys on https://keys.openpgp.org
+without User-ID. The instructions for verifying persmule's signatures have
+been added.
+Canary Verification Procedures
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+. To verify biergaizi's signature...
+    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
+    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
+    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.
+    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.
+. To verify persmule's signature...
+    a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published
+    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using
+    the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without
+    User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described
+    below.
+    b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver,
+    such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The
+    fingerprint is 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60. Note that, to
+    import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver
+    website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a
+    technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not
+    work.
+    c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped
+    that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid
+    E-mail address, "glahamm <yiam5Od@gliwrad.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is
+    allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys.
+    d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from
+    https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key.
+    Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's
+    now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly.
+    e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by
+    persmule's key can now be verified as usual. Debian is known to work, most
+    other systems should work just fine, but not Fedora. The subkeys contains
+    signatures made with Brainpool curves, which are disabled on Fedora due to
+    potential patent-licensing problems, causing a "Unknown elliptic curve"
+    error.
+. To verify vimacs' signature...
+    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
+    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
+    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403.
+    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.
 Proof of Freshness
@@ Line 75: / Line 131: @@
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
- Almost 100,000 children are leaving school without five good GCSEs, Children's commissioner reveals
+ Post Office scandal latest: Fujitsu data was 'manipulated', inquiry hears - watch live
- BBC and father who challenged Prime Minister step in to defend Laura Kuenssberg
+ Fujitsu boss admits moral obligation to compensate Horizon victims
- Girls school runs stand up comedy classes for pupils so they have courage to ask for pay rises in the future
+ Tuesday evening news briefing: Fujitsu boss apologises for Horizon scandal
- Child sex abuse victims "re-traumatised by frustrating, hostile and futile' battle for compensation, inquiry finds
+ Monday evening news briefing: Sunak warns Houthis after fresh missile attack
- Premier League footballer fled hotel window in his underpants after being filmed on bed with woman who wasn't his partner, blackmail trial hears
+ Police failings left girls at mercy of Rochdale grooming gangs, report finds
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
- Attack on Saudi Arabia Tests U.S. Guarantee to Defend Gulf
+ Israel-Hamas War: U.S. to Return Yemens Houthi Militia to Terrorism List
- Brownface, Blackface and About-Face. Is Trudeau Who He Says He Is?
+ Iranian Strikes in Iraq and Pakistan Inflame Regional Tensions
- Syrian Children Saved a German Village. And a Village Saved Itself.
+ Why Rishi Sunaks Conservatives Have Splintered Into Factions
- Netanyahu and Gantz Agree on Unity, but Not on What It Means
+ Zelensky Calls for Peace, Not More Weapons, in Davos
- New Video Surfaces Showing Trudeau in Blackface, Compounding Scandal
+ Israel Unearths More of a Subterranean Fortress Under Gaza
 $ date -R -u
-Fri, 20 Sep 2019 01:47:02 +0000
+Wed, 17 Jan 2024 11:42:14 +0000
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 </code>

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