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blug-canary-2 [2019/11/21 16:06]
persmule
blug-canary-2 [2020/07/16 16:22]
persmule
Line 8: Line 8:
 ==================================== ====================================
  
-Issued for November 2019.+Issued for July 2020.
  
 Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
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 * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
 * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
-wnereiz  0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72+vimacs   0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
  
 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.
Line 63: Line 63:
  
 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
-weeks of December 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published+weeks of August 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
 by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.
  
Line 69: Line 69:
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  
-1. Since mid-Octoberpersmule's old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has +1. Due to personal reasonswnereiz (0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72) voluntarily decided 
-expired. A new key0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, has been +to quit from the warrant canary team and he is no longer a signer of the 
-created and uploaded to https://keys.openpgp.org/, it can be obtained from +warrant canary documents since April 15th2020. All statements from the 
-this keyserver.+warrant canary documents before this date are still validThis is an official 
 +decision that can be verified by checking the warrant canary document in April, 
 +signed by wneriez.
  
-2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary +2. In the previously mentioned document designed by wneriez in April 2020, 
-documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two +the date in its statements was mistakenly written as "April 15th, 2019", 
-documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency.+which was a typo, but cannot be changed due to the nature of digital signature. 
 +We declare that it's hereby corrected to "April 15th, 2020".
  
-3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. +3. A new membervimacs (0xEA2DB82FE04A9403) has became a new signer since this 
-This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above +month. You can validate the new keys by cross-checking the other two copies of 
-were valid, and are still valid.+this documentsigned by biergaizi and persmule.
  
-4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns +4. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature 
-within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's personal User-ID has +verification an issue and somewhat challenge. For completenesscomplete 
-not published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver. Instead, only +procedures for canary verification has been added.
-cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any +
-User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without +
-User-ID to standard GnuPG installationas a result, it's not possible +
-for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule.+
  
-5We are looking for solutionBut for nowwe decided that the best +Canary Verification Procedures 
-option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
-As temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by + 
-biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the StatementsBy signing +1To verify biergaizi's signature... 
-their own copiesit indicates that the new key has been verified privately + 
-by them as valid.+    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserversuch as 
 +    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint 
 +    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. 
 + 
 +    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 
 + 
 +2. To verify persmule's signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Unfortunately, it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key- 
 +    servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a 
 +    countermeasure, persmule'new public key has been published to the 
 +    https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently, 
 +    it's impossible to import OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a 
 +    3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. 
 + 
 +    b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the 
 +    canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity 
 +    of the canary documentsThis effectively reduced the number of signers 
 +    to two people. It reduces the level of confidencebut currently there is 
 +    no alternative option yet. 
 + 
 +    c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is 
 +    resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this 
 +    would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the 
 +    documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data 
 +    tampering has occurred. 
 + 
 +3. To verify vimacs' signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Due to the recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, vimacs has published 
 +    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org, again, without a User- 
 +    ID. But it's possible for a 3rd-party to verify the signatures by following 
 +    these steps. 
 + 
 +    b. Use Debian GNU/Linux operating system and install GnuPG. Other operating 
 +    systems may lack the necessary out-of-tree GnuPG patches required, Debian 
 +    must be used. 
 + 
 +    c. Fetch vimacs' old public key from a traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such 
 +    as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint 
 +    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. You should see an expired 
 +    public key.
  
-6This effectively reduced the number of signers to two peopleIt reduces +    dFetch vimacs' new public key from https://keys.openpgp.org, using the same 
-the level of confidencebut currently there is no alternative option yet.+    fingerprintand import the public key. You should see that the public 
 +    key has been updated.
  
-7Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is +    ePlease note that the key is still shown as "expired" because the new key 
-resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactivelyand this +    has no UID associated. But you should be able to see a newvalid (not 
-would effectively restore the level of confidenceYou can archive +    expired) subkey by...
-persmule's signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to +
-ensure no data tampering has occured.+
  
-8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz's signing keys are unchanged, +        $ gpg --list-options show-unusable-subkeys --list-keys 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
-but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the +
-canary document for clarity.+
  
-9When new information is available, it will be published in the "Special +    fNow, it's possible to verify the signature by following the standard 
-Announcementssection in future warrant canary documents.+    procedures. Ignore the "key expired" warning (because the latest UID is 
 +    not published, only the expired UIDs are available).
  
 Proof of Freshness Proof of Freshness
Line 117: Line 155:
  
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
- 'Designer babies' may not be as smart or tall as parents expect, study warns + Travel latest: Scottish hotels lose bookings as Sturgeon threatens to quarantine English visitors 
- Cambridge University students cry fowl over 17th century painting that upsets vegetarians + Azeri minister sacked for 'meaningless' efforts over conflict with Armenia 
- Indian businessman wore pilot disguise to get upgrades and special treatment + Leicester lockdown map: What are the rules, and when will it end? 
- Russia 'ruinedUkrainian naval vessels before handing them back, says Ukrainian navy + Shoppers paid 2.50 to call customer helplines they could have called for free 
- Killer of Helen McCourt to be released despite refusing to reveal location of her body+ Winona Ryder says it is 'impossible' to believe allegations against Johnny Depp, as statements from star's exes are released
  
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
- At Odds With Labour, Britains Jews Are Feeling Politically Homeless + U.S. Wants to Bar Members of Chinas Communist Party. Who Are They? 
- Prince Andrews Friendship With Epstein Joins List of Royal Scandals + Can Angela Merkel Seal Her Legacy With a Coronavirus Rescue Deal? 
- Afghanistans CurseA Bomb From 2 Wars Ago Crushes a Family Today + Big Business in BangladeshSelling Fake Coronavirus Certificates 
- Arab Thinkers Call to Abandon Boycotts and Engage With Israel + Bristol Removes Statue of Black Protester Jen Reid After One Day 
- Rodrigo Duterte Calls for Ban on Public Vaping in the Philippines+ Shamima Begum, Who Joined ISIS in Syria, Can Return to U.K., Court Says
  
 $ date -R -u $ date -R -u
-Thu, 21 Nov 2019 16:03:28 +0000+Thu, 16 Jul 2020 15:48:07 +0000
  
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
  
-iQEzBAEBCgAdFiEEwonfPqgFyacM7J3iwYAPuUJ74CEFAl3WtYsACgkQwYAPuUJ7 +iQEzBAEBCgAdFiEEwonfPqgFyacM7J3iwYAPuUJ74CEFAl8QdsUACgkQwYAPuUJ7 
-4CFi3ggA3x0ZIMF9pLOSagf+9JVbk7zTAzUK3BMKZTGR8CZ/TebkaSX72/SSLGEQ +4CHZ7gf/UWfWUcMSOQenMfHPz2DRupY4GedG7Q3M6DF+tmjMFBsT9cq/C8TwCnhS 
-g9KNf7ZxhdjKXUlU93Ori6C90yfLfGQ/mOGNjj/pcWx/s3kR9q6r/fLjG3D2UpAF +UUUX3gQLrMTIledYyUcUyXIwsP095BFMXYBjof1EJkyW7iSEERabH9b9bUCF1H2T 
-izX1t76YSBoAoDQ2PJbRNmpZpsGTz51CLIgEdkH+javtqqcIfhJUF+71XKdU8BNv +gI4l+lGb3Fy6Zdupb79R94/ccNm22yPxQ6WpOs9vTn7oBEiQnHU+S1vN21Tu89yr 
-IEtHvO9j0pD3m9mbiXW768B+R8LEQc6UKrxUc7u8aX/rXSRjcHg+F5iK8ED91fSy +vjhohFWUfvoPqWV1mgp2A1x5lE+aochtkyWWnJOxkUe6SQPcxwvBQYgnBoEEGFd3 
-7zs2ls4VYs2m2S8slyMm8YlKWiFZUEcVGwCvhyqNTlTvg9MVIh8ol4yFuAZ+PTfK +hRZNXCfpVJeMAzc9VwZn/ZKKvDTI7WZ29+0Q/pYbtg3nAQf8YlBStAoZEvzQDTHI 
-tXPOvb75y1ghdqYAE7xROoMvc2jQqA== +x6F7SwdEI355H3KLRkP0lgWnzLBDEw== 
-=yM0h+=N9h9
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 </code> </code>
blug-canary-2.txt · Last modified: 2024/03/31 15:06 by persmule