blug-canary-3
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blug-canary-3 [2019/07/11 15:53] BLUG Admin |
blug-canary-3 [2024/02/26 06:08] vimacs |
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| ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ||
| - | < | + | < |
| - | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- | + | |
| Hash: SHA512 | Hash: SHA512 | ||
| Line 8: | Line 7: | ||
| ==================================== | ==================================== | ||
| - | Due to personal reason, wnereiz | + | Issued for February 2024. |
| - | sign the warrent | + | |
| - | will replace him as the signer, we'll give a status update | + | Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the |
| - | warrant canary update | + | digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! |
| + | |||
| + | Signers | ||
| + | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
| + | |||
| + | * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D | ||
| + | * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 | ||
| + | * vimacs | ||
| + | |||
| + | THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | ||
| + | |||
| + | You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, | ||
| + | one is located at: | ||
| + | |||
| + | * https:// | ||
| + | |||
| + | It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, | ||
| + | but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed | ||
| + | by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Statements | ||
| + | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
| + | |||
| + | 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our | ||
| + | entire system is sound. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, | ||
| + | to our best knowledge. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or | ||
| + | information leakage to a third party. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 5. We haven' | ||
| + | from any authorities, | ||
| + | |||
| + | 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar | ||
| + | orders from the government of the People' | ||
| + | |||
| + | 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary | ||
| + | documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | ||
| + | " | ||
| + | NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | ||
| + | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant | ||
| + | canary | ||
| + | |||
| + | 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | ||
| + | weeks of March 2024. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published | ||
| + | by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature | ||
| + | verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, | ||
| + | procedures for canary verification is included here. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Special Announcements | ||
| + | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
| + | |||
| + | 1. We've found a workaround for importing keys on https:// | ||
| + | without User-ID. The instructions for verifying persmule' | ||
| + | been added. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Canary Verification Procedures | ||
| + | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
| + | |||
| + | 1. To verify biergaizi' | ||
| + | |||
| + | a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as | ||
| + | https:// | ||
| + | is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. | ||
| + | |||
| + | b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 2. To verify persmule' | ||
| + | |||
| + | a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published | ||
| + | the OpenPGP public key to https:// | ||
| + | the standard method, it's impossible to import | ||
| + | User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described | ||
| + | below. | ||
| + | |||
| + | b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, | ||
| + | such as https:// | ||
| + | fingerprint is 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60. Note that, to | ||
| + | import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver | ||
| + | | ||
| + | technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" | ||
| + | work. | ||
| + | |||
| + | c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped | ||
| + | that we specifically created, leaving only a " | ||
| + | E-mail address, " | ||
| + | allowing the subsequent import | ||
| + | |||
| + | d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from | ||
| + | https:// | ||
| + | Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's | ||
| + | now possible to import the https:// | ||
| + | |||
| + | e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by | ||
| + | persmule' | ||
| + | other systems should work just fine, but not Fedora. The subkeys contains | ||
| + | signatures made with Brainpool curves, which are disabled on Fedora due to | ||
| + | potential patent-licensing problems, causing a " | ||
| + | error. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 3. To verify vimacs' | ||
| + | |||
| + | a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as | ||
| + | https:// | ||
| + | is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. | ||
| + | |||
| + | b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Proof of Freshness | ||
| + | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
| + | |||
| + | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
| + | 2024 US election: Your complete guide | ||
| + | | ||
| + | | ||
| + | | ||
| + | | ||
| + | |||
| + | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
| + | The Spy War: How the C.I.A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin | ||
| + | In Russia, Knowing That Her Son Is Dead, and Waiting for Him Anyway | ||
| + | | ||
| + | | ||
| + | A Re-established West Bank Settlement Symbolizes Hardened Israeli Views | ||
| + | |||
| + | $ date -R -u | ||
| + | Mon, 26 Feb 2024 06:07:08 +0000 | ||
| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
| - | Version: GnuPG v2 | ||
| - | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAl0nVxMACgkQ+tPrBeiO | + | iHUEARYKAB0WIQRlsdhNDMVQSujfnGCovW2B2flWVAUCZdwqwAAKCRCovW2B2flW |
| - | jW1dGQ// | + | VMg+AP9plcxEvLMFVJu5Jfupo46yX4wYh46p6olzzKeXATs1swD8DBgZpMIK4rCv |
| - | K92DNzUF06LxqL/ | + | 0jJTefyYm00C+Y3ERFotwy+ZWYjFXAQ= |
| - | XkDF69Lp6dG41hlLHCAyYGpGxW9KTWEQI1uNeFwXGzSpVJRwwnEpAJp6Qo+d4ccZ | + | =LR0e |
| - | RPAp0J875I+yCwO4tmOUczFUYtFTPZDODLJJfvstFpqpzQ4G5gXeediBgVz9xAYG | + | |
| - | tw75LMUd5AmkMk69868bdk/ | + | |
| - | iF0KQDU3NDGahzGFPW6ojAChes4hFGN2yJpzqzJ6rLVtbtjzfkaLbn6qSY9GO8QX | + | |
| - | mqrjRjENZtk01RDjHpKQ7lWQGXPn5Jdd7DtlszmXrKhOZ98c1x5A8M4vOXKbZXnE | + | |
| - | q6XhR3Bjd0Wf8cV0GR9gt6couKxOad7ZHyndrSI/ | + | |
| - | sB7POSx2rvUuGP6mvRjLGSaXtcn1xGhJlEZt9IlJTP+RX6ajsCcTi9mWmw9MXFAW | + | |
| - | hQqVe8ScBBiIPPQ2FjMF6klMqhsv0NRoLLX60W9SkPaPBTED7l0TbtZf+CSLaJrA | + | |
| - | 3SZmVbCkjvxuS+YKpt5hed6QwkS3tIrQdxZP9ewf2g5i+Bft1T8= | + | |
| - | =NPiB | + | |
| -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
| </ | </ | ||
blug-canary-3.txt · Last modified: 2024/04/26 02:33 by vimacs
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