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blug-canary-3 [2019/07/23 11:18] Wu Delin Update for Jun 2019 |
blug-canary-3 [2020/01/17 02:57] Wu Delin |
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====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ||
- | < | + | < |
- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- | + | |
Hash: SHA512 | Hash: SHA512 | ||
Line 8: | Line 7: | ||
==================================== | ==================================== | ||
- | Issued for June 2019. | + | Issued for January 2020. |
Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | ||
Line 16: | Line 15: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | * biergaizi: | + | * biergaizi: |
- | * persmule : 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 | + | * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 |
- | * wnereiz | + | * wnereiz |
THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | ||
Line 55: | Line 54: | ||
8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | ||
- | 9. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | + | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary |
- | weeks of July 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is | + | documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, |
- | published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | + | " |
+ | NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | ||
+ | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant | ||
+ | canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | ||
+ | weeks of February 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published | ||
+ | by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | ||
Special Announcements | Special Announcements | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | None. | + | 1. Since mid-October, |
+ | expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, | ||
+ | created and uploaded to https:// | ||
+ | this keyserver. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary | ||
+ | documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two | ||
+ | documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. | ||
+ | This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above | ||
+ | were valid, and are still valid. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns | ||
+ | within the community, as a countermeasure, | ||
+ | not published to the https:// | ||
+ | cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any | ||
+ | User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without | ||
+ | User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, | ||
+ | for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best | ||
+ | option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. | ||
+ | As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by | ||
+ | biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing | ||
+ | their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately | ||
+ | by them as valid. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces | ||
+ | the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is | ||
+ | resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, | ||
+ | would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive | ||
+ | persmule' | ||
+ | ensure no data tampering has occured. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz' | ||
+ | but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the | ||
+ | canary document for clarity. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 9. When new information is available, it will be published in the " | ||
+ | Announcements" | ||
Proof of Freshness | Proof of Freshness | ||
Line 68: | Line 116: | ||
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | Fast & Furious stuntman in hospital with serious head injuries | + | Hong Kong Express Airways says sorry after forcing passenger to take pregnancy test |
- | North Korea' | + | Philip Green:US courtdelays sex assault hearing |
- | UK heatwave:Britain could experience hottest night on record, as NHS advises people | + | Cyprus rape case: Teenager launches appeal against conviction for lying |
- | Andy Murray' | + | |
- | GP receptionists will offer patients appointments at chemists, in bid to take pressure off family doctors | + | British Airways emits most carbon emissions compared with rival carriers, study reveals |
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | Mob Attack at Hong Kong Train Station Heightens Seething Tensions | + | In Huawei Battle, China Threatens Germany Where It Hurts: Automakers |
- | Even as Tensions With Iran Rise Over Seized Ship, U.K. Stays Committed to Nuclear Deal | + | Japan Confirms First Case of New Chinese Coronavirus |
- | India Launches Chandrayaan-2 Moon Mission on Second Try | + | |
- | With Guns, Cash and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia | + | |
- | | + | U.S. and Iran Are Trolling Each Other |
$ date -R -u | $ date -R -u | ||
- | Tue, 23 Jul 2019 01:38:16 +0000 | + | Fri, 17 Jan 2020 02:55:33 +0000 |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
- | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/ | + | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/ |
- | QYQRzQ/9EYudy2Fxn+kllCcJqTroDhMr9fqr9zOt60TUlT8kPsj8w8jzl3x8HI9b | + | QYRH+xAAgM98RzAhli8QKXSjbessXNKMRaTXY+LlB99DJpxLQb/BE3JeqtxH81d7 |
- | elhcwQnR7UPUPbOv+oV/JBs4cwpeJ9m5FBrQ/qE7XwRUGp+pQhVNbOskys1OJa0S | + | QNeH9eORRn+uodpFwLIBzI2oO8KR9GlmxPPBzKZ5lAhEUvMcwdZO6NaIAwjtWtAS |
- | nnHLr4ApK2RSJO1E/JtxJIVUGrX4Iw4MZHma+4/ | + | DSWa5pVsjlN7FgwbmnbEEp6JbrM64BvqlVJ+GmsRrgzw/pg3HGEOV1iu7TST9F8g |
- | LYmpum7z2MXuIZ9xyD0xi6NPdhqZwd86ZqALx55n0JRAeB/ | + | Xf7BkUcHY/M8PavXndyHJxccrhXh6CrXLmKk/ |
- | keAvDNJAuRMF07EjWiN8FBTi3tFWAP1ccW5INRZNngss3XnR9tPxZFotxdkw6ZkE | + | VOVTovHcVLuW8TXv/S2QGi1g3JgB46a+CtwZZRZSQLT/VpeDQXa6G6fywL46e6By |
- | T3f6ANlcTkv9YrwehEunKcWT36t/RdrGNlJw64D4HZV9imwSBvlgmjvG7IewUAn5 | + | s8qmBjhEpVAs1Hh4sdBKwf7hAzVj9qSgiMVy57MKVWDzGtfn5xAz3Q+i16vr4xXH |
- | 4LKMZtMomcpTxqXw4+TdZx6UuMtePkjsSZJHhVeWOfIFq9yZQ4cqB+QxIicJOEun | + | KOaW4n9JUOBo6Gk7G1sRfdTajukkHYc1b7afJa9hcUI4zKZi0QzMmc5kBWtMfA74 |
- | iGrXfVQR7rruKjJ/hS/G7iXgr/ | + | fMZX/I5VdMTmoDvfDn6LR55+PVpuu8sibzaOMBiLmoPu2r4Kst+aq/ |
- | CinR9LECvj2FkjFXu++YdXlywSwgOhzqOfAAmIczVyO7kLc2BnINeCNC82+UdKfX | + | AHdI6igpHW2EQjO/L2ih/s2j2XHM8BpplFT2iT2t3fgrmeGgNP9kc5BcrNwJwPXj |
- | jL4ynH7l8AmYFPglBf6arkemMd/jh8Ca/ | + | nLGExmEPu1ZiBXC7Rm8PJL8856J3t7KZeplMYMCq0F8CimZTjVbbnY3i9CeGnSuu |
- | 4lrHmiGCQrnO9I1w7tud1lQdrUwCzp+RcQUW5RyJ22+AcOZcLN8= | + | ckNiY114FtxuKXpOs+1xindiuThudgiNtdMWp+8y3/Yq8XiWCpU= |
- | =+v9q | + | =O+IO |
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
</ | </ | ||