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blug-canary-3 [2019/08/16 02:49] Wu Delin |
blug-canary-3 [2020/05/14 12:49] vimacs May 2020 canary #3 |
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====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ||
- | < | + | < |
- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- | + | |
Hash: SHA512 | Hash: SHA512 | ||
Line 8: | Line 7: | ||
==================================== | ==================================== | ||
- | Issued for August 2019. | + | Issued for May 2020. |
Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | ||
Line 16: | Line 15: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | * biergaizi: | + | * biergaizi: |
- | * persmule : 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 | + | * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 |
- | * wnereiz | + | * vimacs |
THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | ||
Line 55: | Line 54: | ||
8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | ||
- | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrent | + | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant |
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | ||
" | " | ||
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | ||
- | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrent | + | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant |
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | ||
10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | ||
- | weeks of September 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published | + | weeks of June 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published |
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | ||
Line 69: | Line 68: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | 1. Due to personal reasons, wnereiz (0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72) | + | 1. Due to personal reasons, wnereiz (0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72) |
- | couldn' | + | to quit from the warrant canary team and he is no longer a signer of the |
+ | warrant canary documents since April 15th, 2020. All statements from the | ||
+ | warrant | ||
+ | decision that can be verified by checking | ||
+ | signed by wneriez. | ||
- | 2. We determined that this was not a result of any incident. All statements of | + | 2. In the previously mentioned document designed by wneriez in April 2020, |
- | the warrent canary documents are still valid. Furthermore, wnereiz will continue | + | the date in its statements was mistakenly written as "April 15th, 2019", |
- | to sign the canary documents in the future. | + | which was a typo, but cannot be changed due to the nature of digital signature. |
+ | We declare that it's hereby corrected to "April 15th, 2020". | ||
- | 3. We determined that the decision of asking | + | 3. A new member, |
- | replace wnereiz and sign a substitution | + | month. You can validate the new keys by cross-checking the other two copies |
- | decision is thus revoked. | + | this document, signed by biergaizi and persmule. |
- | 4. To avoid future incidents, we have amended | + | 4. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature |
- | canary documents, and added a new Statement to prevent similar issues. | + | verification an issue and somewhat |
+ | procedures for canary verification has been added. | ||
- | 5. The previous warrent canary documents issued | + | Canary Verification Procedures |
- | this version | + | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
+ | |||
+ | 1. To verify biergaizi' | ||
+ | |||
+ | a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as | ||
+ | https:// | ||
+ | is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. | ||
+ | |||
+ | b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 2. To verify persmule' | ||
+ | |||
+ | a. Unfortunately, | ||
+ | servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a | ||
+ | countermeasure, | ||
+ | https:// | ||
+ | it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID | ||
+ | 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. | ||
+ | |||
+ | b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the | ||
+ | | ||
+ | of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers | ||
+ | to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is | ||
+ | no alternative option yet. | ||
+ | |||
+ | c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is | ||
+ | resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, | ||
+ | would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the | ||
+ | documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data | ||
+ | tampering has occurred. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 3. To verify vimacs' | ||
+ | |||
+ | a. Due to the recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, vimacs has published | ||
+ | the OpenPGP public key to https:// | ||
+ | ID. But it's possible for a 3rd-party to verify the signatures by following | ||
+ | these steps. | ||
+ | |||
+ | b. Use Debian GNU/Linux operating system and install GnuPG. Other operating | ||
+ | systems may lack the necessary out-of-tree GnuPG patches required, Debian | ||
+ | must be used. | ||
+ | |||
+ | c. Fetch vimacs' | ||
+ | as https:// | ||
+ | | ||
+ | public key. | ||
+ | |||
+ | d. Fetch vimacs' | ||
+ | fingerprint, | ||
+ | key has been updated. | ||
+ | |||
+ | e. Please note that the key is still shown as " | ||
+ | has no UID associated. But you should be able to see a new, valid (not | ||
+ | expired) subkey by... | ||
+ | |||
+ | $ gpg --list-options show-unusable-subkeys --list-keys 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 | ||
+ | |||
+ | f. Now, it's possible to verify the signature by following the standard | ||
+ | procedures. Ignore the "key expired" | ||
+ | not published, only the expired UIDs are available). | ||
Proof of Freshness | Proof of Freshness | ||
Line 90: | Line 154: | ||
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | Donald Trump 'has discussed buying Greenland from Denmark' | + | Travel restriction updates: Antibody tests could allow holidays to resume |
- | Dale Earnhardt Jr escapes burning private jet with family | + | Clap For Our Carers: what time is the NHS applause tonight? |
- | UK weather: Flood warning as England braces for month' | + | |
- | NHS to scrap standard health MOTs for over 40s | + | Exclusive: Second more deadly wave of coronavirus 'to hit Europe this winter' |
- | | + | Can I take ibuprofen to treat coronavirus symptoms? Expert advice |
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | | + | |
- | | + | |
- | Going From Hong Kong to Mainland China? Your Phone Is Subject to Search | + | |
- | | + | |
- | The Law Israel Used to Keep Omar and Tlaib Out | + | |
$ date -R -u | $ date -R -u | ||
- | Fri, 16 Aug 2019 02:46:10 +0000 | + | Thu, 14 May 2020 12:45:15 +0000 |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
- | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/ | + | iHUEARYKAB0WIQSk6G5G0KgwQYRNdeEkSefAFKcZwAUCXr09iwAKCRAkSefAFKcZ |
- | QYSV7RAAhxG2W+UD2BWFb7g4bqzYX3Hn9YWh8TSHow4qQA4F2WBy+QBZmV4Ospgx | + | wGEoAQCgFBMOWin6oU9AFxNJikPxflehBY2hEnmhyop45y39xAEAhIVW595KP0N3 |
- | f4jOYJ2k5oCnfBi2DePxWCio7ehDoPtZEwhtZX/ | + | c05lwIm4kGUmsrbkgeRAI1nLxOECSwg= |
- | I1rkYQPWfLIUdmxMG7ZQiVnAwQCPXhfViruj0YgyvXWC+PcKM1+e5TTAgAcIXuoF | + | =RP5g |
- | wrCKjOvQt9skn5t952jUfAWU7Nz5zCkomNJR9IXW/ | + | |
- | wiqyQpykpFJpdYCGuGWykAmAbV5kAr9EoW1KNum5GzGWuO444plKxM02QAMtpNrl | + | |
- | fOgpXm4pttcrcqjb4Ju6RGYZ959YTrV8ZbLWLq5ehojAevaX5C4JhFHNUK+jTtd7 | + | |
- | 73Og4lV7daLSg0c2w137YBi3ywG8WPdiGzhi+F40qcj9o41MaSMR1G9lerM5K/ | + | |
- | 2y0AKCQaHu8+h5aqdfTaBd+wALT2os+fAJM8HCwGhUKGEIwNI8cOnwgtLpqCgRnS | + | |
- | xAxOYB19ANXlblHiCJbSiSgZ7eW4G5HouEtGPKZRlpJFFBZ99d2NOf7m2tdj6d8v | + | |
- | x75x+V+GowhYggQAlhC2orYucVKIY6kSOeZeXP+h1JfrvI0OILmuDyyvWwkozOMB | + | |
- | 3KCUpXGGwBNTvegzqohq2AvzJE/ | + | |
- | =vwzL | + | |
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
+ | |||
</ | </ | ||