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blug-canary-3 [2019/09/15 03:18] Wu Delin |
blug-canary-3 [2019/12/20 12:40] Wu Delin |
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==================================== | ==================================== | ||
- | Issued for September | + | Issued for December |
Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | ||
Line 16: | Line 16: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | * biergaizi: | + | * biergaizi: |
- | * persmule : 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 | + | * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 |
- | * wnereiz | + | * wnereiz |
THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | ||
Line 55: | Line 55: | ||
8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | ||
- | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrent | + | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant |
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | ||
" | " | ||
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | ||
- | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrent | + | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant |
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | ||
10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | ||
- | weeks of October 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published | + | weeks of January 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published |
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | ||
Line 69: | Line 69: | ||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
- | None. | + | 1. Since mid-October, |
+ | expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, | ||
+ | created and uploaded to https:// | ||
+ | this keyserver. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary | ||
+ | documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two | ||
+ | documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. | ||
+ | This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above | ||
+ | were valid, and are still valid. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns | ||
+ | within the community, as a countermeasure, | ||
+ | not published to the https:// | ||
+ | cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any | ||
+ | User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without | ||
+ | User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, | ||
+ | for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best | ||
+ | option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. | ||
+ | As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by | ||
+ | biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing | ||
+ | their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately | ||
+ | by them as valid. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces | ||
+ | the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is | ||
+ | resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, | ||
+ | would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive | ||
+ | persmule' | ||
+ | ensure no data tampering has occured. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz' | ||
+ | but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the | ||
+ | canary document for clarity. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 9. When new information is available, it will be published in the " | ||
+ | Announcements" | ||
Proof of Freshness | Proof of Freshness | ||
Line 75: | Line 117: | ||
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | NHS bosses tried to 'gag' | + | Royal family pictures of the week |
- | US blames Iran for attack on Saudi Arabia | + | UK weather: Christmas chaos as railway and motorways |
- | Girls as young as 11 are filming themselves | + | Watch the dramatic moment police rescue man from burning car |
- | | + | The history of Hanukkah: How the 'miracle of the oil' |
- | 4.8m golden lavatory stolen from Blenheim Palace ... police have nothing to go on | + | Facebook: personal details of 267 million users ' |
$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
- | Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by Drone Strike, and U.S. Blames Iran | + | Fighting as Masked Vigilantes, Brazils Police Leave a Trail of Bodies |
- | Iraq Faces a New Adversary: Crystal Meth | + | Where Doctors Are Criminals |
- | Top Canadian Intelligence Official Charged With Leaking Secrets | + | In Japan, Irans President May Be Seeking a Line to the U.S. |
- | | + | 2 Firefighters Die in Australia Fires and Scott Morrison Ends Vacation |
- | Is Trumps America Tougher | + | Malta Murder Investigation Closes In on Mafia State |
$ date -R -u | $ date -R -u | ||
- | Sun, 15 Sep 2019 03:16:48 +0000 | + | Fri, 20 Dec 2019 12:38:57 +0000 |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
- | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/ | + | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/ |
- | QYSLjRAAhxXRSg6QeZu9yDZl9f2x+RnDTUSobcymkpUEf+8z5taogAkP6AeSaaK8 | + | QYTzAw// |
- | JkbLzoOmevMrF675Ljw6tr8xQQsZcz71js8XID1/r3zDENzxGt/JhJC4yIFE27MJ | + | Hgd5LXmyLUG9tKD+Sv4LYkj+iAsFt/ |
- | eRksLM3bs962KgewcJKgcCR6SvnT6bvnKWBJoNaHJyON53vYbWcIYUfZ2zJydwHj | + | UJhHN8Ugy1n5YBPrU49yuwtnoXe3C8528wHvuM2r0K0sAy8NWQ67Ry0Fyhv14aQQ |
- | rEIQateXsH9u9q3swKsQV1m/qKQ1iU2Cf+YhiA7GB8AvGOYLNKMBjlbXmJ6+qQFt | + | 9hRw86ogHQmbDZrxJjpCAQZWDKppCH9WvJCuTk+uFjD2HF/uUh0pJcaB2UdOo/9R |
- | CGdpej3an/Ci0EsQftiwqSlLXzmWRfEi913cLO3ilSAv5IdFVSa2zObRw282GO0K | + | HGbg2ysgF9Pn6drx1OkDvjd7/2qx6WANX0JtnBB7oVrBYLQdXzH6LrdETVhGNKXM |
- | gI5tA1Rw51HM87EP5GtPqu3RQclNJLS9JGlIZHb3v+CBpw1yrVUf7J6REmO4ccR2 | + | hJViCErrGgKZvnLN0SxJiRP3lxnUjULif7qKKi7acCOpfX2/0lXdoKIkeup5f7n5 |
- | DoEswL0rRqjU7NEJZWasxp1e/7MsulHrLSiKYWyeEr8HUiP1eCv75axL3jxRJuf8 | + | 5uQmpkNVbLfCdO4hoF8Ka9wlDpj3loxhbRWW1OJJaFWAMxA/DhTRfVkIHwmygO3Q |
- | 8MLXUwDsU03JAqeEpkjUg0XUHRiaxYRL90yNhvxa+LQ00vfAqm1hCe29CR3DS+Ud | + | R1iIvmzFQD2eLKCxkqVdZar5TgvCVjafoScqyTabLZWygMBqjsY8kIte9XScYFT+ |
- | u1Bt7P61QdUn27CDc4zQU0fUqHsBR+fdqNtEDFTFeuQCIADzmlM1SOdMlxR6r0kP | + | E97Et6YjnwZHy8zcfRp7l8AkyTX6vXo90Rg2YONujo+OxVHH/ |
- | S+U0KzJFjv2m7y57J3R+6k/fncUj/vgoXxikdYBtwS0unm6/ | + | 2G1xjyukzjlpk2Uf5T4iut7B1jfcDbOjmOFkCPDnuywTZjhhE0aiH3jN/j/4xZAW |
- | 9broIGU4lmDZeQ+Pu5phU+akqbMcCs7WCQnb3pqFzgC0ZqgbaGM= | + | UXEUJlANwnOdO8p7fQySnHZeZh8TlniszkN4zf9unKhxcYYOKvk= |
- | =UdZG | + | =2hOP |
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
</ | </ | ||