blug-canary-3
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blug-canary-3 [2019/10/17 08:05] Wu Delin |
blug-canary-3 [2019/11/23 08:57] Wu Delin |
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| ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ||
| - | < | + | < |
| + | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- | ||
| Hash: SHA512 | Hash: SHA512 | ||
| Line 7: | Line 8: | ||
| ==================================== | ==================================== | ||
| - | Issued for October | + | Issued for November |
| Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the | ||
| Line 15: | Line 16: | ||
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
| - | * biergaizi: | + | * biergaizi: |
| - | * persmule : 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 | + | * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 |
| - | * wnereiz | + | * wnereiz |
| THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | ||
| Line 54: | Line 55: | ||
| 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | ||
| - | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrent | + | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant |
| documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | ||
| " | " | ||
| NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | ||
| - | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrent | + | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant |
| canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. | ||
| 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | ||
| - | weeks of November | + | weeks of December |
| by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | ||
| Line 68: | Line 69: | ||
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
| - | None. | + | 1. Since mid-October, |
| + | expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, | ||
| + | created and uploaded to https:// | ||
| + | this keyserver. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary | ||
| + | documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two | ||
| + | documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. | ||
| + | This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above | ||
| + | were valid, and are still valid. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns | ||
| + | within the community, as a countermeasure, | ||
| + | not published to the https:// | ||
| + | cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any | ||
| + | User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without | ||
| + | User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, | ||
| + | for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best | ||
| + | option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. | ||
| + | As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by | ||
| + | biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing | ||
| + | their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately | ||
| + | by them as valid. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces | ||
| + | the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is | ||
| + | resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, | ||
| + | would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive | ||
| + | persmule' | ||
| + | ensure no data tampering has occured. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz' | ||
| + | but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the | ||
| + | canary document for clarity. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 9. When new information is available, it will be published in the " | ||
| + | Announcements" | ||
| Proof of Freshness | Proof of Freshness | ||
| Line 74: | Line 117: | ||
| $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
| - | Commuters drag Extinction Rebellion protester from roof of train as activists target Tube | + | Iran's internet blackout: What is happening, |
| - | | + | |
| - | | + | |
| - | ' | + | |
| - | | + | Sacha Baron Cohen hits out at social media ' |
| $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
| - | Blow to Boris Johnsons Brexit Plan as He Heads to Brussels | + | The Jungle Prince of Delhi |
| - | | + | |
| - | Japan Spent Mightily to Soften Natures Wrath, but Can It Ever Be Enough? | + | Would-Be Chinese Defector Details Covert Campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan |
| - | | + | |
| - | Where Pugs Rule the Racetrack | + | The World Burns All Year. Are There Enough Planes to Douse the Flames? |
| $ date -R -u | $ date -R -u | ||
| - | Thu, 17 Oct 2019 08:03:49 +0000 | + | Sat, 23 Nov 2019 08:55:34 +0000 |
| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
| - | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/ | + | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/ |
| - | QYQ0MA/ | + | QYSCUBAAkNAoyik1JwUhiqWHZppGfXjK381EJS8xFvxPGn+UN+wsHKfq/jw8yO6i |
| - | BnA2wv2t4Ewfl2nRm3wADzw57otvOOPof61hwO3f5JPP/OVd8mB/ | + | IQ3eoYp6n5/L1mEXYgnAs8YlCxOd4ofaNZi0pfw9HSgSee1zbOUPNjraKS9oZrDC |
| - | wYXwWPIz7ejPaPw4iUtHN6OKcRDcuzUxAzR5FN/ | + | zkz5wTVe1kuwm3dsusoatsPli9c2XhOaGmD0zDA6sfL5jNN+Zhf91m9RQs79nSy7 |
| - | A5OK0yq021xcwQ3yy0cbSjOsbgTJndCVbmO3bOPpvJHo6BLRxG39IdA4uckHkG4W | + | GsX+8qylhuYuEmJTkBW070tL2njNIcpjt4VA5rlxvz2fvjaIiyG03UVJ3NIAfecV |
| - | no/ | + | NFIuEXEi0IdogQ3SqmEFwSa8cK/z34mS9D2apc7x3gkBc9Bw+/SRJ5HSULsLEMtZ |
| - | p+LUmJaPMsJt/+/imONF1LeHZF4TpGMz8WsDEcK8QCyrPxTVoMbVc8OnR8VFObRC | + | / |
| - | 2x4F5anW68XKD+wl8ltg/ | + | 64LMglIcsk58V9s6b4H3EFojafBWCf6mJP8tvU3HVsVzN1CeRXTOgEBR9mrCFCy3 |
| - | HUWvupK6HGVhOPDRSO/ | + | XuQkvtsBGAMhyXd7aez2n5MEgWg0fn67hwauhVFxbmIJxW6gwtaqQP5SyfjUscoN |
| - | 5DuefmZOZtMMiq+JsAF047KeFt1jf/bEjOSiuFY7bmyESJCVCnaYvmacIn9wO+Ts | + | E8/LZxSNQlgoEljl92QzjBxBHhbrWh6ntsAkGxVzpZlWqAaLE3hZb3tHPI+bpnQL |
| - | io5uktGLfNLOguZLTlorwR4Iit1ElE6Y+HkUm7nFUAxaD9WMZ37Cp9iBKNfo3SOz | + | a1tsBy9skLR3ALVq618zVY0dCBANrsjN4id0u1dRZNFvBBOy/ |
| - | RHyciGwLxa2idSc1qU3OzYUSXF/ | + | aDXGBklgZC4akOpbqGg9qO14Jer0c3jCcUtkDaTidCjNHdsQN8k= |
| - | =25rr | + | =Myog |
| -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
| </ | </ | ||
blug-canary-3.txt · Last modified: 2024/03/25 01:13 by vimacs
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