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blug-canary-3 [2019/07/11 15:53] BLUG Admin |
blug-canary-3 [2024/04/26 02:33] (current) vimacs |
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====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== | ||
- | < | + | < |
- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- | + | |
Hash: SHA512 | Hash: SHA512 | ||
Line 8: | Line 7: | ||
==================================== | ==================================== | ||
- | Due to personal reason, wnereiz | + | Issued for April 2024. |
- | sign the warrent | + | |
- | will replace him as the signer, we'll give a status update | + | Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the |
- | warrant canary update | + | digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! |
+ | |||
+ | Signers | ||
+ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
+ | |||
+ | * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D | ||
+ | * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 | ||
+ | * vimacs | ||
+ | |||
+ | THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. | ||
+ | |||
+ | You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, | ||
+ | one is located at: | ||
+ | |||
+ | * https:// | ||
+ | |||
+ | It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, | ||
+ | but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed | ||
+ | by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Statements | ||
+ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
+ | |||
+ | 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our | ||
+ | entire system is sound. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, | ||
+ | to our best knowledge. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or | ||
+ | information leakage to a third party. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 5. We haven' | ||
+ | from any authorities, | ||
+ | |||
+ | 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar | ||
+ | orders from the government of the People' | ||
+ | |||
+ | 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary | ||
+ | documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, | ||
+ | " | ||
+ | NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available | ||
+ | again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant | ||
+ | canary | ||
+ | |||
+ | 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three | ||
+ | weeks of May 2024. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published | ||
+ | by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature | ||
+ | verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, | ||
+ | procedures for canary verification is included here. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Special Announcements | ||
+ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
+ | |||
+ | 1. We've found a workaround for importing keys on https:// | ||
+ | without User-ID. The instructions for verifying persmule' | ||
+ | been added. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Canary Verification Procedures | ||
+ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
+ | |||
+ | 1. To verify biergaizi' | ||
+ | |||
+ | a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as | ||
+ | https:// | ||
+ | is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. | ||
+ | |||
+ | b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 2. To verify persmule' | ||
+ | |||
+ | a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published | ||
+ | the OpenPGP public key to https:// | ||
+ | the standard method, it's impossible to import | ||
+ | User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described | ||
+ | below. | ||
+ | |||
+ | b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, | ||
+ | such as https:// | ||
+ | fingerprint is 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60. Note that, to | ||
+ | import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver | ||
+ | | ||
+ | technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" | ||
+ | work. | ||
+ | |||
+ | c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped | ||
+ | that we specifically created, leaving only a " | ||
+ | E-mail address, " | ||
+ | allowing the subsequent import | ||
+ | |||
+ | d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from | ||
+ | https:// | ||
+ | Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's | ||
+ | now possible to import the https:// | ||
+ | |||
+ | e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by | ||
+ | persmule' | ||
+ | other systems should work just fine, but not Fedora. The subkeys contains | ||
+ | signatures made with Brainpool curves, which are disabled on Fedora due to | ||
+ | potential patent-licensing problems, causing a " | ||
+ | error. | ||
+ | |||
+ | 3. To verify vimacs' | ||
+ | |||
+ | a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as | ||
+ | https:// | ||
+ | is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. | ||
+ | |||
+ | b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Proof of Freshness | ||
+ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | ||
+ | |||
+ | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
+ | | ||
+ | | ||
+ | | ||
+ | When is the US election? Everything you need to know about the 2024 race | ||
+ | St Georges Day 2024: Englands legendary story and how to celebrate | ||
+ | |||
+ | $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https:// | ||
+ | Gaza Authorities Say More Bodies Were Discovered in Mass Grave | ||
+ | | ||
+ | Ariel Henry Resigns as Prime Minister as Haiti Installs Ruling Council | ||
+ | | ||
+ | | ||
+ | |||
+ | $ date -R -u | ||
+ | Fri, 26 Apr 2024 02:32:57 +0000 | ||
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
- | Version: GnuPG v2 | ||
- | iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAl0nVxMACgkQ+tPrBeiO | + | iHUEARYKAB0WIQRlsdhNDMVQSujfnGCovW2B2flWVAUCZisSbgAKCRCovW2B2flW |
- | jW1dGQ//aEJQV89ac5k4IUK3GztQ50pcUHNMKp2rLqr6mNIzkzfW9TQ+FnS2S0WP | + | VF02AQCyhEgMWWvxVR3nrKrSsp0ME/MHj3wgqfJC5w6waxJ0fQEAyh//ye4P7Crw |
- | K92DNzUF06LxqL/5Z982ZBOKNOAdsy2tc6lOZSeFIXNk7wTPmYdKBpcVQ+4JXMht | + | BTMZ6heV4NXyj3ovKnC5F2TiDd1ONA4= |
- | XkDF69Lp6dG41hlLHCAyYGpGxW9KTWEQI1uNeFwXGzSpVJRwwnEpAJp6Qo+d4ccZ | + | =qlH0 |
- | RPAp0J875I+yCwO4tmOUczFUYtFTPZDODLJJfvstFpqpzQ4G5gXeediBgVz9xAYG | + | |
- | tw75LMUd5AmkMk69868bdk/ | + | |
- | iF0KQDU3NDGahzGFPW6ojAChes4hFGN2yJpzqzJ6rLVtbtjzfkaLbn6qSY9GO8QX | + | |
- | mqrjRjENZtk01RDjHpKQ7lWQGXPn5Jdd7DtlszmXrKhOZ98c1x5A8M4vOXKbZXnE | + | |
- | q6XhR3Bjd0Wf8cV0GR9gt6couKxOad7ZHyndrSI/ | + | |
- | sB7POSx2rvUuGP6mvRjLGSaXtcn1xGhJlEZt9IlJTP+RX6ajsCcTi9mWmw9MXFAW | + | |
- | hQqVe8ScBBiIPPQ2FjMF6klMqhsv0NRoLLX60W9SkPaPBTED7l0TbtZf+CSLaJrA | + | |
- | 3SZmVbCkjvxuS+YKpt5hed6QwkS3tIrQdxZP9ewf2g5i+Bft1T8= | + | |
- | =NPiB | + | |
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- | ||
</ | </ | ||