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blug-canary-3 [2019/07/11 15:53]
BLUG Admin
blug-canary-3 [2024/04/26 02:33] (current)
vimacs
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 ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ======
  
-<code> +<code>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----+
 Hash: SHA512 Hash: SHA512
  
Line 8: Line 7:
 ==================================== ====================================
  
-Due to personal reasonwnereiz is no longer available and couldn't +Issued for April 2024. 
-sign the warrent canary before the end of June 2019new member + 
-will replace him as the signerwe'll give status update in the +Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the 
-warrant canary update of July.+digital signatures! Alsomake sure the keys are correct! 
 + 
 +Signers 
 +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 + 
 +* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D 
 +* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 
 +* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 
 + 
 +THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. 
 + 
 +You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next 
 +one is located at: 
 + 
 +* https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-1 
 + 
 +It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, 
 +but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated 
 +by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. 
 + 
 +Statements 
 +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 + 
 +1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our 
 +entire system is sound. 
 + 
 +2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, 
 +to our best knowledge. 
 + 
 +3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 
 + 
 +4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or 
 +information leakage to a third party. 
 + 
 +5. We haven'received any specific orders, requests or recommendations 
 +from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 
 + 
 +6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar 
 +orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 
 + 
 +7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 
 + 
 +8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 
 + 
 +9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary 
 +documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the 
 +"Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD 
 +NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available 
 +again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant 
 +canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 
 + 
 +10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three 
 +weeks of May 2024. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published 
 +by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. 
 + 
 +11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature 
 +verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete 
 +procedures for canary verification is included here. 
 + 
 +Special Announcements 
 +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 + 
 +1. We've found a workaround for importing keys on https://keys.openpgp.org 
 +without User-ID. The instructions for verifying persmule's signatures have 
 +been added. 
 + 
 +Canary Verification Procedures 
 +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 + 
 +1. To verify biergaizi's signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as 
 +    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint 
 +    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. 
 + 
 +    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 
 + 
 +2. To verify persmule's signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyserverspersmule has published 
 +    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using 
 +    the standard method, it's impossible to import OpenPGP public key without 
 +    User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described 
 +    below. 
 + 
 +    b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, 
 +    such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The 
 +    fingerprint is 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60. Note that, to 
 +    import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver 
 +    website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a 
 +    technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not 
 +    work. 
 + 
 +    c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped 
 +    that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid 
 +    E-mail address, "glahamm <yiam5Od@gliwrad.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is 
 +    allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys. 
 + 
 +    d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from 
 +    https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key. 
 +    Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's 
 +    now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly. 
 + 
 +    e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by 
 +    persmule's key can now be verified as usual. Debian is known to work, most 
 +    other systems should work just fine, but not Fedora. The subkeys contains 
 +    signatures made with Brainpool curves, which are disabled on Fedora due to 
 +    potential patent-licensing problems, causing a "Unknown elliptic curve" 
 +    error. 
 + 
 +3. To verify vimacs' signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as 
 +    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint 
 +    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. 
 + 
 +    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 
 + 
 +Proof of Freshness 
 +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 + 
 +$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml 
 + Thursday evening news briefing: Yousafs political future could lie in Alex Salmonds hands 
 + Wednesday evening news briefing: Teenage girl arrested after two teachers and pupil stabbed 
 + Tuesday evening news briefing: Sunak unveils biggest military spending increase in a generation 
 + When is the US election? Everything you need to know about the 2024 race 
 + St Georges Day 2024: Englands legendary story and how to celebrate 
 + 
 +$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml 
 + Gaza Authorities Say More Bodies Were Discovered in Mass Grave 
 + Deadly Rains and Floods Sweep Cities Across East Africa 
 + Ariel Henry Resigns as Prime Minister as Haiti Installs Ruling Council 
 + Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Snchez Considers Resignation Amid Wifes Investigation 
 + Far-Right Greek Party Is Banned From E.U. Parliament Elections 
 + 
 +$ date -R -u 
 +Fri, 26 Apr 2024 02:32:57 +0000
  
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-=NPiB+
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 </code> </code>
  
blug-canary-3.1562860390.txt.gz · Last modified: 2019/07/11 15:53 by BLUG Admin