User Tools

Site Tools


blug-canary-3

Differences

This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.

Link to this comparison view

Both sides previous revision Previous revision
Next revision
Previous revision
blug-canary-3 [2019/11/23 08:57]
Wu Delin
blug-canary-3 [2020/05/14 12:49] (current)
vimacs May 2020 canary #3
Line 1: Line 1:
 ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ====== ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ======
  
-<​code>​ +<​code>​-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----+
 Hash: SHA512 Hash: SHA512
  
Line 8: Line 7:
 ==================================== ====================================
  
-Issued for November 2019.+Issued for May 2020.
  
 Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
Line 18: Line 17:
 * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
 * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
-wnereiz  ​0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72+vimacs ​  0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
  
 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.
Line 63: Line 62:
  
 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
-weeks of December 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published+weeks of June 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
 by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.
  
Line 69: Line 68:
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  
-1. Since mid-Octoberpersmule'​s old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has +1. Due to personal reasonswnereiz (0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72) voluntarily decided 
-expired. A new key0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60,​ has been +to quit from the warrant canary team and he is no longer a signer of the 
-created and uploaded to https://​keys.openpgp.org/, it can be obtained from +warrant canary documents since April 15th2020. All statements from the 
-this keyserver.+warrant canary documents before this date are still validThis is an official 
 +decision that can be verified by checking the warrant canary document in April, 
 +signed by wneriez.
  
-2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary +2. In the previously mentioned document designed ​by wneriez in April 2020, 
-documents. You can verify ​the signature by crosschecking ​the other two +the date in its statements was mistakenly written as "April 15th, 2019",​ 
-documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency.+which was a typo, but cannot be changed due to the nature of digital signature. 
 +We declare that it's hereby corrected to "April 15th, 2020".
  
-3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed ​by persmule. +3. A new membervimacs (0xEA2DB82FE04A9403) has became a new signer since this 
-This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above +month. You can validate ​the new keys by cross-checking ​the other two copies of 
-were valid, and are still valid.+this documentsigned by biergaizi ​and persmule.
  
-4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers ​have raised great security concerns +4. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature 
-within the community, as a countermeasure,​ persmule'​s personal User-ID has +verification an issue and somewhat ​challenge. For completenesscomplete 
-not published to the https://​keys.openpgp.org/​ keyserver. Instead, only +procedures ​for canary ​verification has been added.
-cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any +
-User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without +
-User-ID to standard GnuPG installationas a result, it's not possible +
-for a 3rd-party to verify the canary ​document signed by persmule.+
  
-5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best +Canary Verification Procedures 
-option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by +
-biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing +
-their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately +
-by them as valid.+
  
-6This effectively reduced the number of signers to two peopleIt reduces +1. To verify biergaizi'​s signature...
-the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet.+
  
-7Once the technical problem of OpenPGP ​public key without User-ID is +    aObtain ​the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as 
-resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this +    ​https://​keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import ​the public keyThe fingerprint 
-would effectively restore ​the level of confidenceYou can archive +    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.
-persmule'​s signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to +
-ensure no data tampering has occured.+
  
-8Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz'​s signing keys are unchanged,​ +    bUse the latest GnuPG in any operating system.
-but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format ​in the +
-canary document for clarity.+
  
-9When new information ​is available, it will be published ​in the "Special +2To verify persmule'​s signature... 
-Announcements" ​section in future warrant canary documents.+ 
 +    a. Unfortunately,​ it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key- 
 +    servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a 
 +    countermeasure,​ persmule'​s ​new public key has been published to the 
 +    https://​keys.openpgp.org/​ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently,​ 
 +    it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a 
 +    3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. 
 + 
 +    b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the 
 +    canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity 
 +    of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers 
 +    to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is 
 +    no alternative option yet. 
 + 
 +    c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is 
 +    resolvedyou can check the previous signatures retroactively,​ and this 
 +    would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the 
 +    documents to your own machine as soon as it'​s ​published ​to ensure no data 
 +    tampering has occurred. 
 + 
 +3. To verify vimacs'​ signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Due to the recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, vimacs has published 
 +    the OpenPGP public key to https://​keys.openpgp.org,​ again, without a User- 
 +    ID. But it's possible for a 3rd-party to verify the signatures by following 
 +    these steps. 
 + 
 +    b. Use Debian GNU/Linux operating system and install GnuPG. Other operating 
 +    systems may lack the necessary out-of-tree GnuPG patches required, Debian 
 +    must be used. 
 + 
 +    c. Fetch vimacs'​ old public key from a traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such 
 +    as https://​keyserver.ubuntu.com,​ and import the public key. The fingerprint 
 +    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. You should see an expired 
 +    public key. 
 + 
 +    d. Fetch vimacs'​ new public key from https://​keys.openpgp.org,​ using the same 
 +    fingerprint,​ and import the public key. You should see that the public 
 +    key has been updated. 
 + 
 +    e. Please note that the key is still shown as "expired"​ because the new key 
 +    has no UID associated. But you should be able to see a new, valid (not 
 +    expired) subkey by... 
 + 
 +        $ gpg --list-options show-unusable-subkeys --list-keys 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 
 + 
 +    f. Now, it's possible to verify the signature by following the standard 
 +    procedures. Ignore the "key expired"​ warning (because the latest UID is 
 +    not published, only the expired UIDs are available).
  
 Proof of Freshness Proof of Freshness
Line 117: Line 154:
  
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://​www.telegraph.co.uk/​news/​rss.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://​www.telegraph.co.uk/​news/​rss.xml
- Iran's internet blackoutWhat is happening, and why did the government turn it off+ Travel restriction updates: Antibody tests could allow holidays to resume 
- Pictures of the Day: 23 November 2019 + Clap For Our Carerswhat time is the NHS applause tonight
- Colombia protestsPresident Duque imposes curfew in Bogota ​to shut down unrest + Suicide bomb in eastern Afghanistan kills five 
- ​Strictly Come Dancing's Anton du Beke says he would welcome same-sex pairings + ExclusiveSecond more deadly wave of coronavirus 'to hit Europe this winter
- Sacha Baron Cohen hits out at social media '​propaganda'​+ Can I take ibuprofen to treat coronavirus symptoms? Expert advice on painkillers and Covid-19
  
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://​rss.nytimes.com/​services/​xml/​rss/​nyt/​World.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://​rss.nytimes.com/​services/​xml/​rss/​nyt/​World.xml
- The Jungle Prince of Delhi +
- The Broken Promise of a Panda: How Pragues Relations With Beijing Soured +
- ​Would-Be Chinese Defector Details Covert Campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan +
- ​Israelis Call Netanyahu Indictment an Earthquake, but Agree on Little Else +
- The World Burns All Year. Are There Enough Planes to Douse the Flames?+
  
 $ date -R -u $ date -R -u
-Sat23 Nov 2019 08:55:34 +0000+Thu14 May 2020 12:45:15 +0000
  
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
  
-iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/​nkFgy0Or5D/​NPDHQYQFAl3Y9C4ACgkQr5D/​NPDH +iHUEARYKAB0WIQSk6G5G0KgwQYRNdeEkSefAFKcZwAUCXr09iwAKCRAkSefAFKcZ 
-QYSCUBAAkNAoyik1JwUhiqWHZppGfXjK381EJS8xFvxPGn+UN+wsHKfq/​jw8yO6i +wGEoAQCgFBMOWin6oU9AFxNJikPxflehBY2hEnmhyop45y39xAEAhIVW595KP0N3 
-IQ3eoYp6n5/​L1mEXYgnAs8YlCxOd4ofaNZi0pfw9HSgSee1zbOUPNjraKS9oZrDC +c05lwIm4kGUmsrbkgeRAI1nLxOECSwg
-zkz5wTVe1kuwm3dsusoatsPli9c2XhOaGmD0zDA6sfL5jNN+Zhf91m9RQs79nSy7 +=RP5g
-GsX+8qylhuYuEmJTkBW070tL2njNIcpjt4VA5rlxvz2fvjaIiyG03UVJ3NIAfecV +
-NFIuEXEi0IdogQ3SqmEFwSa8cK/​z34mS9D2apc7x3gkBc9Bw+/​SRJ5HSULsLEMtZ +
-/​JK85YblrS4IlioBe8czqbgw9GWMfFgaTEov3M0s4gYVkXx+JAnMxtxtzfkvKWwO +
-64LMglIcsk58V9s6b4H3EFojafBWCf6mJP8tvU3HVsVzN1CeRXTOgEBR9mrCFCy3 +
-XuQkvtsBGAMhyXd7aez2n5MEgWg0fn67hwauhVFxbmIJxW6gwtaqQP5SyfjUscoN +
-E8/​LZxSNQlgoEljl92QzjBxBHhbrWh6ntsAkGxVzpZlWqAaLE3hZb3tHPI+bpnQL +
-a1tsBy9skLR3ALVq618zVY0dCBANrsjN4id0u1dRZNFvBBOy/​fkbMrTZ84tFq74r +
-aDXGBklgZC4akOpbqGg9qO14Jer0c3jCcUtkDaTidCjNHdsQN8k+
-=Myog+
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 +
 </​code>​ </​code>​
  
blug-canary-3.1574499447.txt.gz · Last modified: 2019/11/23 08:57 by Wu Delin