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--- blug-canary-3 [2019/11/23 08:57]
Wu Delin
+++ blug-canary-3 [2020/05/14 12:49] (current)
vimacs May 2020 canary #3
@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 ====== Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (3/3) ======
-<code>
+<code>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
------BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 Hash: SHA512
@@ Line 8: / Line 7: @@
 ====================================
-Issued for November 2019.
+Issued for May 2020.
 Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
@@ Line 18: / Line 17: @@
 * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
 * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
-* wnereiz  : 0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72
+* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.
@@ Line 63: / Line 62: @@
 . We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
-weeks of December 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
+weeks of June 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
 by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.
@@ Line 69: / Line 68: @@
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-. Since mid-October, persmule's old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has
+. Due to personal reasons, wnereiz (0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72) voluntarily decided
-expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, has been
+to quit from the warrant canary team and he is no longer a signer of the
-created and uploaded to https://keys.openpgp.org/, it can be obtained from
+warrant canary documents since April 15th, 2020. All statements from the
-this keyserver.
+warrant canary documents before this date are still valid. This is an official
+decision that can be verified by checking the warrant canary document in April,
+signed by wneriez.
-. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary
+. In the previously mentioned document designed by wneriez in April 2020,
-documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two
+the date in its statements was mistakenly written as "April 15th, 2019",
-documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency.
+which was a typo, but cannot be changed due to the nature of digital signature.
+We declare that it's hereby corrected to "April 15th, 2020".
-. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule.
+. A new member, vimacs (0xEA2DB82FE04A9403) has became a new signer since this
-This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above
+month. You can validate the new keys by cross-checking the other two copies of
-were valid, and are still valid.
+this document, signed by biergaizi and persmule.
-. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns
+. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
-within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's personal User-ID has
+verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
-not published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver. Instead, only
+procedures for canary verification has been added.
-cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any
-User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without
-User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, as a result, it's not possible
-for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule.
-. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best
+Canary Verification Procedures
-option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key.
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by
-biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing
-their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately
-by them as valid.
-. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces
+. To verify biergaizi's signature...
-the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet.
-. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is
+    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
-resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this
+    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
-would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive
+    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.
-persmule's signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to
-ensure no data tampering has occured.
-. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz's signing keys are unchanged,
+    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.
-but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the
-canary document for clarity.
-. When new information is available, it will be published in the "Special
+. To verify persmule's signature...
-Announcements" section in future warrant canary documents.
+    a. Unfortunately, it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key-
+    servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a
+    countermeasure, persmule's new public key has been published to the
+    https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently,
+    it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a
+rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule.
+    b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the
+    canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity
+    of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers
+    to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is
+    no alternative option yet.
+    c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is
+    resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this
+    would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the
+    documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data
+    tampering has occurred.
+. To verify vimacs' signature...
+    a. Due to the recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, vimacs has published
+    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org, again, without a User-
+    ID. But it's possible for a 3rd-party to verify the signatures by following
+    these steps.
+    b. Use Debian GNU/Linux operating system and install GnuPG. Other operating
+    systems may lack the necessary out-of-tree GnuPG patches required, Debian
+    must be used.
+    c. Fetch vimacs' old public key from a traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such
+    as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
+    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. You should see an expired
+    public key.
+    d. Fetch vimacs' new public key from https://keys.openpgp.org, using the same
+    fingerprint, and import the public key. You should see that the public
+    key has been updated.
+    e. Please note that the key is still shown as "expired" because the new key
+    has no UID associated. But you should be able to see a new, valid (not
+    expired) subkey by...
+        $ gpg --list-options show-unusable-subkeys 	--list-keys 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
+    f. Now, it's possible to verify the signature by following the standard
+    procedures. Ignore the "key expired" warning (because the latest UID is
+    not published, only the expired UIDs are available).
 Proof of Freshness
@@ Line 117: / Line 154: @@
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
- Iran's internet blackout: What is happening, and why did the government turn it off?
+ Travel restriction updates: Antibody tests could allow holidays to resume
- Pictures of the Day: 23 November 2019
+ Clap For Our Carers: what time is the NHS applause tonight?
- Colombia protests: President Duque imposes curfew in Bogota to shut down unrest
+ Suicide bomb in eastern Afghanistan kills five
- Strictly Come Dancing's Anton du Beke says he would welcome same-sex pairings
+ Exclusive: Second more deadly wave of coronavirus 'to hit Europe this winter'
- Sacha Baron Cohen hits out at social media 'propaganda'
+ Can I take ibuprofen to treat coronavirus symptoms? Expert advice on painkillers and Covid-19
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
- The Jungle Prince of Delhi
- The Broken Promise of a Panda: How Pragues Relations With Beijing Soured
- Would-Be Chinese Defector Details Covert Campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan
- Israelis Call Netanyahu Indictment an Earthquake, but Agree on Little Else
- The World Burns All Year. Are There Enough Planes to Douse the Flames?
 $ date -R -u
-Sat, 23 Nov 2019 08:55:34 +0000
+Thu, 14 May 2020 12:45:15 +0000
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-aDXGBklgZC4akOpbqGg9qO14Jer0c3jCcUtkDaTidCjNHdsQN8k=
-=Myog
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 </code>

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