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blug-canary-1 [2019/11/30 15:50]
Tom Li
blug-canary-1 [2020/05/26 13:47] (current)
BLUG Admin
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 ==================================== ====================================
  
-Issued for November 2019.+Issued for May 2020.
  
 Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
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 * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
 * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
-wnereiz  ​0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72+vimacs ​  0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
  
 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.
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 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
-weeks of December 2019. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published+weeks of June 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
 by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.
  
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 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  
-1. Since mid-Octoberpersmule'​s old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has +1. Due to personal reasonswnereiz (0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72) voluntarily decided 
-expired. A new key0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60,​ has been +to quit from the warrant canary team and he is no longer a signer of the 
-created and uploaded to https://​keys.openpgp.org/, it can be obtained from +warrant canary documents since April 15th2020. All statements from the 
-this keyserver.+warrant canary documents before this date are still validThis is an official 
 +decision that can be verified by checking the warrant canary document in April, 
 +signed by wneriez.
  
-2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary +2. In the previously mentioned document designed ​by wneriez in April 2020, 
-documents. You can verify ​the signature by crosschecking ​the other two +the date in its statements was mistakenly written as "April 15th, 2019",​ 
-documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency.+which was a typo, but cannot be changed due to the nature of digital signature. 
 +We declare that it's hereby corrected to "April 15th, 2020".
  
-3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed ​by persmule. +3. A new membervimacs (0xEA2DB82FE04A9403) has became a new signer since this 
-This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above +month. You can validate ​the new keys by cross-checking ​the other two copies of 
-were valid, and are still valid.+this documentsigned by biergaizi ​and persmule.
  
-4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers ​have raised great security concerns +4. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature 
-within the community, as a countermeasure,​ persmule'​s personal User-ID has +verification an issue and somewhat ​challenge. For completenesscomplete 
-not published to the https://​keys.openpgp.org/​ keyserver. Instead, only +procedures ​for canary ​verification has been added.
-cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any +
-User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without +
-User-ID to standard GnuPG installationas a result, it's not possible +
-for a 3rd-party to verify the canary ​document signed by persmule.+
  
-5We are looking for solutionBut for nowwe decided that the best +Canary Verification Procedures 
-option ​is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
-As temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by + 
-biergaizi and wnereiz ​to decide the validity of the StatementsBy signing +1To verify biergaizi'​s signature... 
-their own copiesit indicates that the new key has been verified privately + 
-by them as valid.+    ​a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserversuch as 
 +    https://​keyserver.ubuntu.com,​ and import ​the public key. The fingerprint 
 +    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. 
 + 
 +    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 
 + 
 +2. To verify persmule'​s signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Unfortunately,​ it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key- 
 +    servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a 
 +    countermeasure,​ persmule'​s ​new public ​key has been published to the 
 +    https://​keys.openpgp.org/​ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently, 
 +    ​it'​s impossible to import ​OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a 
 +    3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. 
 + 
 +    b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should ​check the 
 +    ​canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs ​to decide the validity 
 +    ​of the canary documentsThis effectively reduced the number of signers 
 +    to two people. It reduces the level of confidencebut currently there is 
 +    no alternative option yet. 
 + 
 +    c. Once the technical problem of using a public ​key without User-ID is 
 +    resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively,​ and this 
 +    would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the 
 +    documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data 
 +    tampering ​has occurred. 
 + 
 +3. To verify vimacs'​ signature... 
 + 
 +    a. Due to the recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, vimacs has published 
 +    the OpenPGP public key to https://​keys.openpgp.org,​ again, without a User- 
 +    ID. But it's possible for a 3rd-party to verify the signatures ​by following 
 +    these steps. 
 + 
 +    b. Use Debian GNU/Linux operating system and install GnuPG. Other operating 
 +    systems may lack the necessary out-of-tree GnuPG patches required, Debian 
 +    must be used. 
 + 
 +    c. Fetch vimacs'​ old public key from a traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such 
 +    ​as https://​keyserver.ubuntu.com,​ and import the public key. The fingerprint 
 +    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. You should see an expired 
 +    public key.
  
-6This effectively reduced the number of signers to two peopleIt reduces +    dFetch vimacs'​ new public key from https://​keys.openpgp.org,​ using the same 
-the level of confidencebut currently there is no alternative option yet.+    fingerprintand import the public key. You should see that the public 
 +    key has been updated.
  
-7Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public ​key without User-ID ​is +    ePlease note that the key is still shown as "​expired"​ because the new key 
-resolved, ​you can check the previous signatures retroactivelyand this +    has no UID associated. But you should be able to see a newvalid (not 
-would effectively restore the level of confidenceYou can archive +    ​expired) subkey by...
-persmule'​s signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to +
-ensure no data tampering has occured.+
  
-8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz'​s signing keys are unchanged,​ +        $ gpg --list-options show-unusable-subkeys ​     --list-keys 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403
-but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the +
-canary document for clarity.+
  
-9When new information is available, it will be published in the "​Special +    fNow, it's possible to verify ​the signature by following the standard 
-Announcements" ​section in future warrant canary documents.+    ​procedures. Ignore the "key expired"​ warning (because the latest UID is 
 +    not published, only the expired UIDs are available).
  
 Proof of Freshness Proof of Freshness
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 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://​www.telegraph.co.uk/​news/​rss.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://​www.telegraph.co.uk/​news/​rss.xml
- London Bridge attack: Usman Khan was studentand personal friend of Anjem Choudary + Britain in coronavirus lockdown, in pictures 
- 'A beautiful spirit who always took the side of the underdog'​London Bridge victim named as Jack Merritt + Travel restriction updatesGreece could block British arrivals unless UK infection rate falls 
- Cyprus farmers warn of halloumi shortages over EU protection plans + What are the quarantine rules in Spain, France and other countries? 
- ​Europe becomes cocaine exporter as countries ​overflow with drug + Watch: How to make a no-sewgovernment-approved cloth face mask 
- Crossbow killer, 51who shot his heavily pregnant ex-wife in 'evil' revenge attack jailed for 33 years+ ​Contact tracing: how will the UK's test, track and trace plan help ease lockdown
  
 $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://​rss.nytimes.com/​services/​xml/​rss/​nyt/​World.xml $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://​rss.nytimes.com/​services/​xml/​rss/​nyt/​World.xml
- Students Fainting From Hunger in Venezuelas Failing School System + Coronavirus Live News: Global Updates 
- For Filipino Seafarers, a Lonely Life Celebrated ​in Song + Heres How Wuhan Tested 6.5 Million for Coronavirus ​in Days 
- ​How ​an Anti-Brexit London District Could Help Boris Johnson Triumph + How the Taliban Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage 
- ​Spains Leftist Outsiders Are on the Verge of Getting Inside + Chinas Military Vows to Defend the Countrys Interests ​in Hong Kong 
- Stabbings Around London Bridge Kill 2 in Terrorist Incident+ On a Scottish Isle, Nursing Home Deaths Expose a Covid-19 Scandal
  
 $ date -R -u $ date -R -u
-Sat30 Nov 2019 15:48:22 +0000+Tue26 May 2020 13:45:10 +0000
  
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-Version: GnuPG v2 
  
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-jW1ePA/7B0KjWXQU6bMlzrh9HggghVmRMju6d0Ox43UYa2jAKkG/XfxWk6h33kH1 +jW2Fkw//f8osAGVE0JRiWjPsUjBpB9lg+CJjpM2KlfY/​143Jblg8m8k9CRfWpKhG 
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-qmc89M6GblgJXSQOeTCaspcuWR+x4VGuOX8mOzBs65tmmsm4YY0+yNxgEdwZSXXSfDaVcDtiAOykIYQoEy2n4Pf1PeFMNNWwL/​0KqAk
-=7+YM+=uqbn
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
 </​code>​ </​code>​
blug-canary-1.1575129006.txt.gz · Last modified: 2019/11/30 15:50 by Tom Li