Archives of historical canaries can be found at:
If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3) ==================================== Issued for December 2019. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * wnereiz : 0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of January 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. Since mid-October, persmule's old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, has been created and uploaded to https://keys.openpgp.org/, it can be obtained from this keyserver. 2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency. 3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above were valid, and are still valid. 4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's personal User-ID has not published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver. Instead, only cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, as a result, it's not possible for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. 5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately by them as valid. 6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. 7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive persmule's signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to ensure no data tampering has occured. 8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz's signing keys are unchanged, but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the canary document for clarity. 9. When new information is available, it will be published in the "Special Announcements" section in future warrant canary documents. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml New Year's Eve 2020 celebrations and fireworks around the world US embassy in Baghdad evacuated as protesters denounce US air strikes Australia Day 2020: Why the British sent convicts Down Under - and how they named the country The Telegraph's top 25 stories of the year: from the Philip Green accusers to Joaquin Phoenix's big interview walk-out Chinese New Year 2020: Rats, luck and why you should avoid medicine, laundry and crying children $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml American Airstrikes Rally Iraqis Against U.S. Inside Chinas Push to Turn Muslim Minorities Into an Army of Workers A Slow-Motion Chernobyl: How Lax Laws Turned a River Into a Disaster Left Behind by Migrant Husbands, Women Break the Rules and Go to Work In Indonesia, Outlaw Gold Miners Poison Themselves to Survive $ date -R -u Tue, 31 Dec 2019 10:52:37 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAl4LKIkACgkQ+tPrBeiO jW1d7A/9Gh/qbEAASTx7l+sY848cANrEkPu5OsHFWDQaChpLfrWV0OK0wsfryKjX XbDXPMSgz3Bd1j2F7BH4u+Nh28Bfx0UTEmf9Ityiwnm93ReFLHr3U/RUuYVJ9jPM xxhaSaoKkQtZkxrTNjxWd1MshypEAeIN74wew/0VlM5S1Bd1lB+gmnmcechztKiL YGertw4CKWCE9qYELPpBqCNz07l7J8RH/oGoTghraJ9knyTboIvr80MupwHA8rMG yB/get/uYEuYiU5AfzvUN+DUuhpbhklipEsDSXhOWAx9hVusBGRGYUpUY2ujvdjj 566pU6ylYz3t4ia1mKj4H4gbELZnFuqympPPLCHMRLblhMv9D0vgaA3bBDWVRc+C kUvJiN7v4aY+X2KXhrIFMs0wuCH8JABoAY42Zve5Me5tTn6hArH8rpcZ6GCC9pCq FjH2sNT9rR4bdQb9sOadBIQhiJb9GteyTy3buTd6zLj6/0zvNTzyqo+DXZfUTHO1 J1UvtQFTwUnmLw6Ur+mWZDLGKCnPVsTzLKb6BnimCpRlbXQq3bDa69Gieb6JCw8l PAlNM48XOJalTGL1yE1Es3Io2VOZS9c00FA57ytvEI52KUCKhHiw4rbWdHsQzOUr DMzj2MnWTwGexZ5YP7l/lPNXaamJSsMLZOQP27UiPOlt6jWj9TY= =1OF7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----