Archives of historical canaries can be found at:
If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3) ==================================== Issued for December 2021. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of January 2022. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. 11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete procedures for canary verification is included here. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ None. Canary Verification Procedures ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. To verify biergaizi's signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 2. To verify persmule's signature... a. Unfortunately, it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key- servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's new public key has been published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data tampering has occurred. 3. To verify vimacs' signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Christmas Day morning UK news briefing: Today's top headlines from The Telegraph Footballer Daniel Sturridge ordered to pay 22,000 reward to man who found his dog Fourth jabs possible as Covid booster immunity may fall for millions by new year Friday evening UK news briefing: MPs should 'learn from' the Queen, says Mike Tindall Christmas travel derailed by engineering works, signal failures and staff sickness $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml In Myanmar, a Notable Burmese Family Quietly Equipped a Brutal Military How Do Saudis Celebrate Christmas? Quietly, but Less So. Europeans Ponder Living With, Not Defeating, Covid An Afghan Official Laments What Was Lost and Looks to What Lies Ahead Despite Omicron Wave, Britons Are Set on Not Losing Another Christmas $ date -R -u Sat, 25 Dec 2021 06:07:35 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAmHGtToACgkQ+tPrBeiO jW2Iqw//RNdKzjvuI7Bl+euApmFkF4AbGPn4d9IYdP59ixFXD7JFwmygO7OlUtJS AlRUy3/q1XZ3acfNAOERd6huTAZ6BOtLHk6mlKpCKMgrfHVGc1TuHIsz90v4hVZN kS6hLq4JE23kazLzkNcEu7UKdDwHmaIDLDvxvlCq84oPBelmdJEZUAzQnf0MA3Hq Y4YWimff2DHLbvRsUq/mdVFEYHNy+3l/xSqnXfnvMFqEIOSXVZRUwQS4NkHido5+ mnZcZpr8yZWfpLQZPqgcd3pwT2gHkTZUkYcARvDfEX4m0BrCLVduazATdiHQiysL nNe+IYuusan0ZbZsvVcvS5RNmFR2J15phVNN/wep7KA4EzYg4zk7jbVyvyae78NR mqeui3KgSUXw6/y//ivLbe12q/IUA+ex83DXftWfXiz/zldDm92JylQZ48jNqMRo 8aMAE/Mg2AludMNF2vYUc/SEZoP1QH5KIulwJbQOj3DKCo2w9o5rbpBP0ZGNg7zh oDKB//+T0lTgeva3gKoalmYel8JrIST6ZRYM2LclAEmtmqPBnsCkLWtcVE9QuuQZ CScJQIv/PF8iz86+q45ZvjUy8NUAcREl7TloON5u0Vlk3LYMs/1b2UH2cCLoW3Lu HH9XPWcI+rmvfJnQ72xE/7cZST/GuRmV3nwTV31lB7uNIO7IDAc= =biCg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----