Archives of historical canaries can be found at:
If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3) ==================================== Issued for October 2021. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of November 2021. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0. Due to an oversight, the third canary document for September 2021 was not signed by vimacs on time. However, all the Statements were and are still valid. The missing document for September was retroactively generated in October 2021. To further ensure the validity of the Statements and Special Announcements, this canary document for October 2021 is modified to include this statement. 2. Outdated information about vimacs becoming a new signer after the departure of wnereiz has been removed. 3. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete procedures for canary verification has been added and updated. Canary Verification Procedures ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. To verify biergaizi's signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 2. To verify persmule's signature... a. Unfortunately, it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key- servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's new public key has been published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data tampering has occurred. 3. To verify vimacs' signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Friday morning UK news briefing: Today's top headlines from The Telegraph Insulate Britain will suspend campaign to give public 'a break' over half term Sarah Everard: North Yorkshire PCC resigns after 'streetwise' comments caused national outcry Banksy's shredded artwork sells for 18.6m in record for artist Thursday evening UK news briefing: The GP workload backlash $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml Deadly Clashes in Beirut Escalate Fears Over Lebanons Dysfunction Mexico City Replaces a Statue of Columbus With One of an Indigenous Woman Taiwan Building Fire Kills at Least 46 Norway Bow-and-Arrow Rampage Treated as Apparent Terrorism Attack North Korean Soldiers Lie Shirtless on Broken Glass $ date -R -u Fri, 15 Oct 2021 04:42:08 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAmFpBq0ACgkQ+tPrBeiO jW1H4Q//RlOC25Xmtje6LwApPKvXRCyIzCZktKXNpy+gI+Jpc3mGg1jy8fpYKSTM hSVEvWGPMIPRoX0CTX5wMyq6f2LvW7ptvI7UGPBywxLUlWpEJ0FERKv4wDVuXU0d IYN6SYeyI9pw/0dB1ri6TDA82yeqkffxmrgPtkEMhYtN4UWJik/+QeU3Qfup5cM4 KEg9gDDuGVn94Q/AHRnXQh0MjFi+EI3f8ghiUugCxK4noqTWjd/VRvwy9vkjsJS1 xx4ybr52mMSyB/y/2R+MTF+zu2c8M7XjmHYnzuglYpfgTsLhTpLPQXyt0rSrdIXr UJgl3LWtYAwjnooy9TUPoXt9U0Ama59CaPVFLcTcDbViiO8tUi5eWT+8XvCPgODd VSxCYy2Z17KVH5m11FEnZwV+crzd7t7SG0P01a0g7/98wF2kOT8JjiQ+MvKTb0dG Kh96EVDvzlMyU6FieSRDck/szQSGgigy4U6at1m3/3qY6BypqiDX6pGdcc0I4cPb nhe1kqh/LJ42MjUmwEgRpKPNDUHi3pRD5yyw1phzc9zeQVFHdSWX+u8cvLFW0xRP jaJmyaUDemN2zvIFGN5oUC/i1X3eOIi4U4gaOrnCFP60nfry+ULsD8kHtxDgNzcK EX4+oPHgyjkK3XZ7BovNXw96PB0AcHp7/W6rmcFWihK8jBRa8FM= =2Sxi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----