Archives of historical canaries can be found at:

https://github.com/beijinglug/warrant-canary

If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3)
====================================

Issued for December 2024.

Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct!

Signers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
* persmule : 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2
* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403

THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.

You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next
one is located at:

* https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2

It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time,
but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated
by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time.

Statements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our
entire system is sound.

2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach,
to our best knowledge.

3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys.

4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or
information leakage to a third party.

5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations
from any authorities, whether formal or informal.

6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar
orders from the government of the People's Republic of China.

7. We have not received any government subpoenas.

8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened.

9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
"Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.

10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
weeks of January 2025. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.

11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
procedures for canary verification is included here.

Special Announcements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

None.

Canary Verification Procedures
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. To verify biergaizi's signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

2. To verify persmule's signature...

    a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published
    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using
    the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without
    User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described
    below.

    b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver,
    such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The
    fingerprint is 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2. Note that, to
    import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver
    website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a
    technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not
    work.

    c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped
    that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid
    E-mail address, "Kikek <othar7ok@ep2quey.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is
    allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys.

    d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from
    https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key.
    Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's
    now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly.

    e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by
    persmule's key can now be verified as usual.

3. To verify vimacs' signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

Proof of Freshness
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
 Eight people injured in Glasgow bus crash
 The Wanteds Max George admitted to hospital with heart issues
 Second person killed in Storm Darragh after tree falls on car
 Ukraine: The Latest - the Telegraphs most popular ever podcast
 Storm Bert: Do not travel, public warned as disruption continues

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
 Anger and Agony in South Korea After Jeju Air Passenger Jet Crashes, Killing 179
 Behind the Dismantling of Hezbollah: Decades of Israeli Intelligence
 Azerbaijan Blames Russia for Plane Crash and Rebukes Kremlin
 Israel Struggles to Halt Attacks From Houthis in Yemen, Once Off Radar
 Georgia Inaugurates Mikheil Kavelashvili as President Amid Anti-Western Drift

$ date -R -u
Mon, 30 Dec 2024 02:43:01 +0000

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