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Archives of historical canaries can be found at:
https://github.com/beijinglug/warrant-canary
If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3) ==================================== Issued for January 2025. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2 * vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of March 2025. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. 11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete procedures for canary verification is included here. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ None. Canary Verification Procedures ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. To verify biergaizi's signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 2. To verify persmule's signature... a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described below. b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7636112A33805777A0646B1BFA7C50B699AC61D2. Note that, to import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not work. c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid E-mail address, "Kikek <othar7ok@ep2quey.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys. d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key. Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly. e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by persmule's key can now be verified as usual. 3. To verify vimacs' signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Chinese New Year 2025: Snakes, traditions and why clocks are unlucky Boy, 16, charged with terror offences after arrest outside mosque in Scotland Storm Eowyn brings chaos but not for everyone Eight people injured in Glasgow bus crash The Wanteds Max George admitted to hospital with heart issues $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml Kremlin Chokes YouTube Service, but Russians Find Ways Around It North Korean Troops in Russia Taken off Front Lines Israel Frees Palestinian Prisoners After Chaotic Hostage Handover After Maha Kumbh Mela Stampede, Concerns of Cover-Up Who Is Syrias New Interim President? $ date -R -u Fri, 31 Jan 2025 09:21:11 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAmeclikACgkQ+tPrBeiO jW1sbA/8C3eCpuj8SNJMwg1sO/5ZJVOHs/4zu7015Vio7/NAMhyf3XaSHrhhBiGV +VI147iZaBn6DDmCw4J67KCPv9kLdRirtmXobc0FzAFkRz32O0ogfoT3SeApte1E 7YWwd8+JQUFCZYKYxUn0/JvexJDaIGnZaBuGgJDG90Ad6vZOi31PkoZuGwE4VSmm 7H2U8HIoFRV4Eu5RSHcyd9pAS7s8TMHpcq+5uAl0rNOLrtfk7Qu7zH5P4Eb0iX3u V/iCFgdTdiPjtOM6sJQ8A09GNT/xSNQmdhp4XC9jkQ8Qv+hzJnBD/xgzduC7F1PM sMqHKbNEQIsv+/CptmSD9bRCpj8zgutCYW9vxsTWkrbq6Zn6y+L3y7n/aMXwLxJW ezAJ6ZHQCixqB+OGG+cJs/u21YjPAL1xxPf0d7C0ML6MlqGk/yoZsMIOl+sCQUBJ mPYYRBJu2igyBbyVivHw10eP0ZUUb/itwqJV7S4rwAFr59hNVPHB3736Th5kFbFY lJA2qbx5jp6XcJeMikQ+KcWQD/iPGMbo/YokY79W6cVqQ0VD424DnUFhaShAbyrr ky10Oox9wJl7kE3tKTjVSmRmbdTO6NC8iSXhJi9BUo5n1NPPfe+EBh+e9rSnnv1S kIu0FrTWYkgOFzyG2M+03eGkDrnKYv6Q7SuqqOnsNYYAfuxNpZw= =r5c7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----