Archives of historical canaries can be found at:
If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3) ==================================== Issued for August 2023. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of September 2023. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. 11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete procedures for canary verification is included here. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. We've found a workaround for importing keys on https://keys.openpgp.org without User-ID. The instructions for verifying persmule's signatures have been added. Canary Verification Procedures ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. To verify biergaizi's signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 2. To verify persmule's signature... a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described below. b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60. Note that, to import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not work. c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid E-mail address, "glahamm <yiam5Od@gliwrad.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys. d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key. Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly. e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by persmule's key can now be verified as usual. Debian is known to work, most other systems should work just fine, but not Fedora. The subkeys contains signatures made with Brainpool curves, which are disabled on Fedora due to potential patent-licensing problems, causing a "Unknown elliptic curve" error. 3. To verify vimacs' signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Lucy Letby inquiry given powers to compel witnesses to give evidence Ukraine: The Latest - What Russian civilians think of Kyiv's drone attacks Wednesday evening news briefing: Criminals will be forced to face sentencing Criminals will be forced into dock to face sentencing Ex-GCHQ worker admits attempted murder of US spy outside leisure centre $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml Russia-Ukraine War: Russia and North Korea in Actively Advanced Talks on Weapons, U.S. Says Chile Searches for Its Disappeared, 50 Years After Coup Nigeria Arrests Dozens Over Same-Sex Wedding For Greek Fires and Other Crises, E.U. Builds Emergency Force Gabon Coup: Military Officers Seize Power From Ali Bongo $ date -R -u Wed, 30 Aug 2023 17:25:13 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAmTve40ACgkQ+tPrBeiO jW22lw//fA6FlwNqVG2FGCCbqli2yBXahDssQkGeJX9h72P0ZSIv6fiW0349OR/i OtME9/wXgfWpzNmyBpuRdUl0sYPJ82ySS3fBfjJ7z249rCI7Tom0QNZ5hu06DQ7P eT/GF37NnFvhiybSbXuNa4p3ZJTDcCd+qCXDus19Z5vIo/JqgaUQEeJENeOtE6JM OiGWUgiegtFninSdqdWOSQhbSuBlNTg9YlWoXuk5uHbLHvMFZFE3xzF+0+yZaRTa DXBdjMkyh6BfQOKSsuhWzryhOmObi9MVey5KRLyAc0WaqxC+TqcrZ3rBj9JFWzHY e8KQRkG8zXvTXZLdX9YdZcZ81n1fMsOla7HVvxpyGn67oB4gymbd6k/14L5ypHV4 f3lQHytQbw83BjO4nXWxBmvFHP3P+S+3RgAV3BVBNFAEI0AYalHhOb+mt43jUWHh IvhMvZ2TwQavd2AdZUBuuw3+lDALrj98grICqYbpsP19YbiFZywXh3k53vnp+2X1 ghPoT+flIhInDBWnOaJc74JcEh6mUEipVPkH+dGCLopAbddcJ/f/7j9+ATD/SITj ZWNWqrBafBPXwHaFcxnBzmfu9bbrxe0T4F9gFza5+M9hIKkqN7dCH+3u1X2pVtPi LOvqmvSIZYR2D/MWRtjgFr8Oab+jYQezTDDLO6ycKrRqdvo9Qf8= =Y5wY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----