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Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (1/3)

Archives of historical canaries can be found at:

https://github.com/beijinglug/warrant-canary

If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3)
====================================

Issued for November 2020.

Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct!

Signers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403

THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.

You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next
one is located at:

* https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2

It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time,
but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated
by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time.

Statements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our
entire system is sound.

2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach,
to our best knowledge.

3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys.

4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or
information leakage to a third party.

5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations
from any authorities, whether formal or informal.

6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar
orders from the government of the People's Republic of China.

7. We have not received any government subpoenas.

8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened.

9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
"Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.

10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
weeks of December 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.

Special Announcements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. Due to personal reasons, wnereiz (0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72) voluntarily decided
to quit from the warrant canary team and he is no longer a signer of the
warrant canary documents since April 15th, 2020. All statements from the
warrant canary documents before this date are still valid. This is an official
decision that can be verified by checking the warrant canary document in April,
signed by wneriez.

2. In the previously mentioned document designed by wneriez in April 2020,
the date in its statements was mistakenly written as "April 15th, 2019",
which was a typo, but cannot be changed due to the nature of digital signature.
We declare that it's hereby corrected to "April 15th, 2020".

3. A new member, vimacs (0xEA2DB82FE04A9403) has became a new signer since this
month. You can validate the new keys by cross-checking the other two copies of
this document, signed by biergaizi and persmule.

4. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
procedures for canary verification has been added.

Canary Verification Procedures
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. To verify biergaizi's signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

2. To verify persmule's signature...

    a. Unfortunately, it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key-
    servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a
    countermeasure, persmule's new public key has been published to the
    https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently,
    it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a
    3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule.

    b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the
    canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity
    of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers
    to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is
    no alternative option yet.

    c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is
    resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this
    would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the
    documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data
    tampering has occurred.

3. To verify vimacs' signature...

    a. Due to the recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, vimacs has published
    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org, again, without a User-
    ID. But it's possible for a 3rd-party to verify the signatures by following
    these steps.

    b. Use Debian GNU/Linux operating system and install GnuPG. Other operating
    systems may lack the necessary out-of-tree GnuPG patches required, Debian
    must be used.

    c. Fetch vimacs' old public key from a traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such
    as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. You should see an expired
    public key.

    d. Fetch vimacs' new public key from https://keys.openpgp.org, using the same
    fingerprint, and import the public key. You should see that the public
    key has been updated.

    e. Please note that the key is still shown as "expired" because the new key
    has no UID associated. But you should be able to see a new, valid (not
    expired) subkey by...

        $ gpg --list-options show-unusable-subkeys 	--list-keys 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403

    f. Now, it's possible to verify the signature by following the standard
    procedures. Ignore the "key expired" warning (because the latest UID is
    not published, only the expired UIDs are available).

Proof of Freshness
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
 When are non-essential shops allowed to reopen, and which stores are open now?
 Rule of six: The social distancing rules and exemptions
 UK Covid-19 cases and deaths: how the UK is coping with a second wave
 Heavy shelling hits capital of Ethiopia's Tigray as forces begin offensive
 Latest local lockdown rules for Northern Ireland

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
 Pedophile Scandal Cant Crack the Closed Circles of Literary France
 Guns, Drugs and Viral Content: Welcome to Cartel TikTok
 Beijing Takes Its South China Sea Strategy to the Himalayas
 Closing Time for a Villages Last Pub?
 As Iran Threatens Payback After Assassination, Germany Urges Restraint

$ date -R -u
Sat, 28 Nov 2020 19:36:04 +0000

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blug-canary-1.txt · Last modified: 2020/11/28 19:37 by BLUG Admin