Archives of historical canaries can be found at:

https://github.com/beijinglug/warrant-canary

If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3)
====================================

Issued for February 2023.

Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct!

Signers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403

THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.

You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next
one is located at:

* https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2

It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time,
but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated
by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time.

Statements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our
entire system is sound.

2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach,
to our best knowledge.

3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys.

4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or
information leakage to a third party.

5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations
from any authorities, whether formal or informal.

6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar
orders from the government of the People's Republic of China.

7. We have not received any government subpoenas.

8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened.

9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
"Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.

10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
weeks of March 2023. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.

11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
procedures for canary verification is included here.

Special Announcements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

None.

Canary Verification Procedures
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. To verify biergaizi's signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

2. To verify persmule's signature...

    a. Unfortunately, it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key-
    servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a
    countermeasure, persmule's new public key has been published to the
    https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently,
    it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a
    3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule.

    b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the
    canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity
    of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers
    to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is
    no alternative option yet.

    c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is
    resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this
    would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the
    documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data
    tampering has occurred.

3. To verify vimacs' signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

Proof of Freshness
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
 Brexit: What is the Northern Ireland Protocol?
 Matt Hancock seen wearing Newcastle United shirt he auctioned off for NHS workers
 Nandos cleaner demanded 20k after he saw staff member drop burger on floor then serve it to customer
 Father-and-son owned business destroyed after crash involving two police cars
 Spectacular Northern Lights seen across UK - and you can see them again tonight

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
 Live Updates: Russia Targets Ukraine With Overnight Drone Strikes
 Russias New Offensive Sends Conscripts Into the Teeth of Ukraines Lines
 Dying Children and Frozen Flocks in Afghanistans Bitter Winter of Crisis
 Live Updates: Britain and E.U. Said to Agree on Northern Ireland Trade Deal
 What Is the Northern Ireland Protocol?

$ date -R -u
Mon, 27 Feb 2023 15:08:21 +0000

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