Archives of historical canaries can be found at:
If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3) ==================================== Issued for August 2021. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of September 2021. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. Due to personal reasons, wnereiz (0xFDFF2E13AA25BE72) voluntarily decided to quit from the warrant canary team and he is no longer a signer of the warrant canary documents since April 15th, 2020. All statements from the warrant canary documents before this date are still valid. This is an official decision that can be verified by checking the warrant canary document in April, signed by wneriez. 2. In the previously mentioned document designed by wneriez in April 2020, the date in its statements was mistakenly written as "April 15th, 2019", which was a typo, but cannot be changed due to the nature of digital signature. We declare that it's hereby corrected to "April 15th, 2020". 3. A new member, vimacs (0xEA2DB82FE04A9403) has became a new signer since this month. You can validate the new keys by cross-checking the other two copies of this document, signed by biergaizi and persmule. 4. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete procedures for canary verification has been added. Canary Verification Procedures ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. To verify biergaizi's signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 2. To verify persmule's signature... a. Unfortunately, it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key- servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's new public key has been published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data tampering has occurred. 3. To verify vimacs' signature... a. Due to the recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, vimacs has published the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org, again, without a User- ID. But it's possible for a 3rd-party to verify the signatures by following these steps. b. Use Debian GNU/Linux operating system and install GnuPG. Other operating systems may lack the necessary out-of-tree GnuPG patches required, Debian must be used. c. Fetch vimacs' old public key from a traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. You should see an expired public key. d. Fetch vimacs' new public key from https://keys.openpgp.org, using the same fingerprint, and import the public key. You should see that the public key has been updated. e. Please note that the key is still shown as "expired" because the new key has no UID associated. But you should be able to see a new, valid (not expired) subkey by... $ gpg --list-options show-unusable-subkeys --list-keys 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 f. Now, it's possible to verify the signature by following the standard procedures. Ignore the "key expired" warning (because the latest UID is not published, only the expired UIDs are available). Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Gogglebox original cast member Andy Michael dies at 61 Large fire in Leamington Spa sees nearby properties evacuated Watch: Dozens dead in Venezuela after floods and landslides triggered by heavy rain Friday morning UK news briefing: Joe Biden pledges to make terror cell pay for Kabul bomb attack BBC presenter dying from rare AstraZeneca blood clot leads to calls for risk awareness $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml What Is ISIS-K, the Islamic State Khorasan? President Duterte Plans to Run for the Vice Presidency Pushing the Limits Paid Off for Didi, Until China Cracked Down Kabul Airport Attack Highlights Enduring Threat of ISIS and Al Qaeda In Britain, Young Children Dont Wear Masks in School $ date -R -u Fri, 27 Aug 2021 12:20:11 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAmEo2JUACgkQ+tPrBeiO jW0qag//cAtsrCAzrELKmLe5Nq6NGnl7Fzpa+143CLLsAdxyd3Dla9T5cQhEdbo9 NOHGbniuN4L5xjel12+/aDj5SFH7B/GQS2Ce1g6HvBo87fsuJ6Kwfzh8cNv144Ec Ln8yaMZ82ADrFCtrktCMltFDnurg6QGVALW/crn1/jw+ufTBU3StdIxha41Vv3ra 2QPPSem2tdrsCBOSjSK23Y/nOe3foJJ4OPGZry7gZJbTbaC1D/2s7uGkaH91YwXc 6SuNEHysrr2N8fSjKRXkgRuvGQrjg6YEFiTofkC49X3MwF0543ssjH6ZZGNvdKAt Ntoa+YPzo27mlr+/oX3LEF/K+NNJjargNKF7TllWfe+LFti9M4ZThfndCS54O1ty hQyaqBEB9UNB0xy+oG2bAoQVegCVBL7NgEetiNKtGOwLGFF3AlJSMrnPTxjH4+3P zeY7l+8OTKiZAMLst7Cl/S/Lp0I+/cM+L12HWPTndmnDixoc0aRgpC5CsQ+1ztOH JYUeX2wIsi63JUvyN+BeEIcTA+0aGI5i9mNz8QU+T7nlY2cxYYZXtxCKn74nCGWM 7I3GQdCtER0WOMzGwYT/sR/PgLBrv9/KfDOVDkz11sbEyRESZlpPCNicSpEIRkDq aEp/yevw1flnpwonpn2Pp4lQDIG7IVPSaA7N+MWq9Y0nSqmHULM= =uZ7W -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----