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Beijing GNU/Linux User Group Canary (1/3)

Archives of historical canaries can be found at:

If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.

Hash: SHA512


Issued for December 2019.

Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct!


* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
* wnereiz  : 0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72


You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next
one is located at:


It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time,
but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated
by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time.


1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our
entire system is sound.

2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach,
to our best knowledge.

3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys.

4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or
information leakage to a third party.

5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations
from any authorities, whether formal or informal.

6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar
orders from the government of the People's Republic of China.

7. We have not received any government subpoenas.

8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened.

9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
"Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.

10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
weeks of January 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.

Special Announcements

1. Since mid-October, persmule's old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has
expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, has been
created and uploaded to, it can be obtained from
this keyserver.

2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary
documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two
documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency.

3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule.
This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above
were valid, and are still valid.

4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns
within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's personal User-ID has
not published to the keyserver. Instead, only
cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any
User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without
User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, as a result, it's not possible
for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule.

5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best
option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key.
As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by
biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing
their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately
by them as valid.

6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces
the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet.

7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is
resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this
would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive
persmule's signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to
ensure no data tampering has occured.

8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz's signing keys are unchanged,
but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the
canary document for clarity.

9. When new information is available, it will be published in the "Special
Announcements" section in future warrant canary documents.

Proof of Freshness

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u
 New Year's Eve 2020 celebrations and fireworks around the world
 US embassy in Baghdad evacuated as protesters denounce US air strikes
 Australia Day 2020: Why the British sent convicts Down Under - and how they named the country
 The Telegraph's top 25 stories of the year: from the Philip Green accusers to Joaquin Phoenix's big interview walk-out
 Chinese New Year 2020: Rats, luck and why you should avoid medicine, laundry and crying children

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u
 American Airstrikes Rally Iraqis Against U.S.
 Inside Chinas Push to Turn Muslim Minorities Into an Army of Workers
 A Slow-Motion Chernobyl: How Lax Laws Turned a River Into a Disaster
 Left Behind by Migrant Husbands, Women Break the Rules and Go to Work
 In Indonesia, Outlaw Gold Miners Poison Themselves to Survive

$ date -R -u
Tue, 31 Dec 2019 10:52:37 +0000

Version: GnuPG v2

blug-canary-1.txt · Last modified: 2019/12/31 10:54 by Tom Li