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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (2/3) ==================================== Issued for October 2023. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-3 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of November 2023. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. 11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete procedures for canary verification is included here. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. We've found a workaround for importing keys on https://keys.openpgp.org without User-ID. The instructions for verifying persmule's signatures have been added. Canary Verification Procedures ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. To verify biergaizi's signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 2. To verify persmule's signature... a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described below. b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60. Note that, to import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not work. c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid E-mail address, "glahamm <yiam5Od@gliwrad.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys. d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key. Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly. e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by persmule's key can now be verified as usual. Debian is known to work, most other systems should work just fine, but not Fedora. The subkeys contains signatures made with Brainpool curves, which are disabled on Fedora due to potential patent-licensing problems, causing a "Unknown elliptic curve" error. 3. To verify vimacs' signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Weather latest: Driver trapped after tree crushes car ahead of Storm Babet arrival Tuesday evening news briefing: Israel to delay Gaza invasion 'until after Biden visit' Greta Thunberg could be allowed to return to UK despite protest arrest Woman fighting for her life and 11 people hurt after bus crash in Manchester Monday evening news briefing: At least six Britons killed in Hamas attacks $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml Israel-Hamas War: Biden Arrives in Israel as Region Reels From Hospital Explosion in Gaza Ukraine Said to Use ATACMS, a Powerful Weapon System, for First Time Fears of Violence Between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon Grow As Israel Ramps Up Gaza Airstrikes, Evacuees Say Nowhere Is Safe Polands Governing Party Looks Set to Be Ousted $ date -R -u Wed, 18 Oct 2023 08:33:57 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEDfvrUpjKhXrxhHZrG+3+G67tLh4FAmUvmHsACgkQG+3+G67t Lh5ckg//TbwTnhdZb+lMb93FX8XtreuDvax+RH7VbSYnXPOc8k+IUT/D4tT9PnBx dIRq9v7VG04zBPpNDJYkGbDRMq/CBbLpZnh2c3+YVjE5lJZko/T7i4xej/Vr8vz7 LZKsi5OmzsYN3g4omWp/QJHAqE7p184pKMJ1CpU+pUwHzrCAhp52Ilc1GqBcGMms yQzCpNlpmf8Y6uuyaleQUQl6mV/+bg2ASvgOBn2wPrzpOVKpwiJmjZdYPdG+BEUR Tz0Ygk8xtu9X0O9fINp4r4sCMjA2qIhOsYAyX2XdaTPZUsDTJsrFFtgxrufLIqde AcxPBx1sZZ9xXNICGyG3/VOSoztA4NCBh18nf+R88MQCLIFweFC4SKqnc4aXro7w YvLVvT39sngieB1Z72bRZxOkL5LscRZgr/KpdZls8DD9DdGzU3usyelJ2ngB2t1V 9M1B7snlzrYO56oZ/r8nwT2nhk7Mj6ON34CyL4xWrkPtvXJEoFMGCewFs4UDm2US e7HUAXBk6JA+H403HW64Utvtm/BGdqHSOfTJQguiKyh8xgzZIKsls/bpTv5M8KjH zDUTOBcoDuVb3vSST1ZJ5jo47b3esfLWfCGVCnAq+kBgzD5odlUXZz2f1jCQGFGq hGY1nN0+cgBJxoUYWS4cGD3rRenr4NVo6t6oAzBfNWQgxe6ln2M= =xrBV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----