BLUG Wiki

This is an old revision of the document!

---

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (2/3)
====================================

Issued for May 2024.

Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct!

Signers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403

THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.

You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next
one is located at:

* https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-3

It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time,
but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated
by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time.

Statements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our
entire system is sound.

2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach,
to our best knowledge.

3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys.

4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or
information leakage to a third party.

5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations
from any authorities, whether formal or informal.

6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar
orders from the government of the People's Republic of China.

7. We have not received any government subpoenas.

8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened.

9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
"Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.

10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
weeks of June 2024. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.

11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
procedures for canary verification is included here.

Special Announcements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. We've found a workaround for importing keys on https://keys.openpgp.org
without User-ID. The instructions for verifying persmule's signatures have
been added.

Canary Verification Procedures
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. To verify biergaizi's signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

2. To verify persmule's signature...

    a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published
    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using
    the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without
    User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described
    below.

    b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver,
    such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The
    fingerprint is 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60. Note that, to
    import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver
    website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a
    technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not
    work.

    c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped
    that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid
    E-mail address, "glahamm <yiam5Od@gliwrad.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is
    allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys.

    d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from
    https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key.
    Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's
    now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly.

    e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by
    persmule's key can now be verified as usual. Debian is known to work, most
    other systems should work just fine, but not Fedora. The subkeys contains
    signatures made with Brainpool curves, which are disabled on Fedora due to
    potential patent-licensing problems, causing a "Unknown elliptic curve"
    error.

3. To verify vimacs' signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

Proof of Freshness
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
 Tuesday evening news briefing: Sunak reveals he has talked to Boris Johnson ahead of election
 Teenager arrested on suspicion of murder after boy stabbed to death
 Friday evening news briefing: Tory exodus breaks 1997 record
 Horizon inquiry: Paula Vennells booed for saying Post Office scandal programme bored her
 Thursday evening news briefing: Sunak facing Tory MP exodus

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
 Middle East Crisis: Israel Used U.S.-Made Bombs in Strike That Killed Dozens Near Rafah
 Russia-Ukraine Border That Separates Families Is Now Also a Front Line
 South Africas Black Elites Sour on the President They Championed
 Can South Africas Opposition Parties Break Through?
 North Koreas Latest Offensive: Dumping Trash on South Korea

$ date -R -u
Wed, 29 May 2024 12:54:41 +0000

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=/u7u
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----