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BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (2/3)
====================================

Issued for August 2024.

Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct!

Signers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D
* persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60
* vimacs   : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403

THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL.

You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next
one is located at:

* https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-3

It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time,
but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated
by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time.

Statements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our
entire system is sound.

2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach,
to our best knowledge.

3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys.

4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or
information leakage to a third party.

5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations
from any authorities, whether formal or informal.

6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar
orders from the government of the People's Republic of China.

7. We have not received any government subpoenas.

8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened.

9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary
documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the
"Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD
NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available
again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant
canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer.

10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three
weeks of September 2024. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published
by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation.

11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature
verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete
procedures for canary verification is included here.

Special Announcements
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. We've found a workaround for importing keys on https://keys.openpgp.org
without User-ID. The instructions for verifying persmule's signatures have
been added.

Canary Verification Procedures
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. To verify biergaizi's signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

2. To verify persmule's signature...

    a. Due to the previous attacks on OpenPGP keyservers, persmule has published
    the OpenPGP public key to https://keys.openpgp.org without a User-ID. Using
    the standard method, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without
    User-ID. But since April 2013, we have developed a workaround, described
    below.

    b. Obtain the dummy public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver,
    such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The
    fingerprint is 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60. Note that, to
    import this key, one must copy and paste the key in ASCII from the Keyserver
    website to a file or console and use the command "gpg --import". Due to a
    technical problem, Using "gpg --recv-key" or "gpg --search-keys" does not
    work.

    c. This is a special dummy public key with its User-IDs and subkeys stripped
    that we specifically created, leaving only a "stub" User-ID (with an invalid
    E-mail address, "glahamm <yiam5Od@gliwrad.invalid>"). Its sole purpose is
    allowing the subsequent import of additional subkeys.

    d. Next, with the stub key already imported, obtain the public key from
    https://keys.openpgp.org using the same fingerprint, and import this key.
    Because the dummy key with its stub User-ID is already in presence, it's
    now possible to import the https://keys.openpgp.org public key directly.

    e. Use the latest GnuPG in most operating system, the signatures made by
    persmule's key can now be verified as usual. Debian is known to work, most
    other systems should work just fine, but not Fedora. The subkeys contains
    signatures made with Brainpool curves, which are disabled on Fedora due to
    potential patent-licensing problems, causing a "Unknown elliptic curve"
    error.

3. To verify vimacs' signature...

    a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as
    https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint
    is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403.

    b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system.

Proof of Freshness
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml
 Tuesday evening news briefing: Only 100 places left in male prisons
 Dozens of residents evacuate as fire engulfs east London high-rise
 Mother stabbed at Notting Hill Carnival was caught in middle of altercation
 Friday evening news briefing: Family and friends pay tribute to Hannah Lynch
 Thursday evening news briefing: Record number of migrants granted asylum

$ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml
 At Least 9 Killed as Israel Begins Major Military Operation in West Bank
 With Hezbollah-Israel Conflict Contained, Irans Next Move May Be Modest
 Last Crusade of Mexicos President: A Drastic Redesign of the Judiciary
 Who Is Telegrams Pavel Durov and Why Was He Arrested in France?
 For Russia, Repelling Incursion Matters Less Than Advancing in Donbas

$ date -R -u
Wed, 28 Aug 2024 12:14:59 +0000

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