- Events
- Projects
- Documents
- Membership
- Communities
This is an old revision of the document!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (3/3) ==================================== Issued for January 2020. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * wnereiz : 0x0A6A91990AC98712274AA18DFDFF2E13AA25BE72 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-1 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of February 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. Since mid-October, persmule's old signing key 0x2987A25DAC8454A5 has expired. A new key, 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60, has been created and uploaded to https://keys.openpgp.org/, it can be obtained from this keyserver. 2. The new key will be used by persmule to sign future warrant canary documents. You can verify the signature by crosschecking the other two documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz for consistency. 3. Due to this key rollover, the October message was not signed by persmule. This did/does not indicate a security incident, all of the statements above were valid, and are still valid. 4. Recent attacks on OpenPGP keyservers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's personal User-ID has not published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver. Instead, only cryptographic information can be obtained from the keyserver, without any User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID to a standard GnuPG installation, as a result, it's not possible for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. 5. We are looking for a solution. But for now, we decided that the best option is starting publishing new canary documents using the new key. As a temporary measure, you can check the canary documents signed by biergaizi and wnereiz to decide the validity of the Statements. By signing their own copies, it indicates that the new key has been verified privately by them as valid. 6. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. 7. Once the technical problem of OpenPGP public key without User-ID is resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive persmule's signature as soon as it's published to your own machine to ensure no data tampering has occured. 8. Unlike persmule, biergaizi and wnereiz's signing keys are unchanged, but the Key-IDs have been changed to its full fingerprint format in the canary document for clarity. 9. When new information is available, it will be published in the "Special Announcements" section in future warrant canary documents. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Hong Kong Express Airways says sorry after forcing passenger to take pregnancy test Philip Green:US courtdelays sex assault hearing Cyprus rape case: Teenager launches appeal against conviction for lying Operation Midland:Metropolitan Police refers itself to watchdog over Carl Beech blunders British Airways emits most carbon emissions compared with rival carriers, study reveals $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml In Huawei Battle, China Threatens Germany Where It Hurts: Automakers Japan Confirms First Case of New Chinese Coronavirus Ukraine Investigates Reports of Surveillance of Marie Yovanovitch Births in China Fall to Lowest Level in Nearly Six Decades U.S. and Iran Are Trolling Each Other in China $ date -R -u Fri, 17 Jan 2020 02:55:33 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE3n2KYOSW/nkFgy0Or5D/NPDHQYQFAl4hImUACgkQr5D/NPDH QYRH+xAAgM98RzAhli8QKXSjbessXNKMRaTXY+LlB99DJpxLQb/BE3JeqtxH81d7 QNeH9eORRn+uodpFwLIBzI2oO8KR9GlmxPPBzKZ5lAhEUvMcwdZO6NaIAwjtWtAS DSWa5pVsjlN7FgwbmnbEEp6JbrM64BvqlVJ+GmsRrgzw/pg3HGEOV1iu7TST9F8g Xf7BkUcHY/M8PavXndyHJxccrhXh6CrXLmKk/4F9xAXxGP5CgUOJTJioWYgzC9iE VOVTovHcVLuW8TXv/S2QGi1g3JgB46a+CtwZZRZSQLT/VpeDQXa6G6fywL46e6By s8qmBjhEpVAs1Hh4sdBKwf7hAzVj9qSgiMVy57MKVWDzGtfn5xAz3Q+i16vr4xXH KOaW4n9JUOBo6Gk7G1sRfdTajukkHYc1b7afJa9hcUI4zKZi0QzMmc5kBWtMfA74 fMZX/I5VdMTmoDvfDn6LR55+PVpuu8sibzaOMBiLmoPu2r4Kst+aq/1JHkYmHnSM AHdI6igpHW2EQjO/L2ih/s2j2XHM8BpplFT2iT2t3fgrmeGgNP9kc5BcrNwJwPXj nLGExmEPu1ZiBXC7Rm8PJL8856J3t7KZeplMYMCq0F8CimZTjVbbnY3i9CeGnSuu ckNiY114FtxuKXpOs+1xindiuThudgiNtdMWp+8y3/Yq8XiWCpU= =O+IO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----