Archives of historical canaries can be found at:
If you are using Tor, please check the canary documents from the clearnet domain instead of Tor hidden service, since the links within the messages are modified to “.onion” and invalidate PGP signatures. Or go to GitHub archives from the link above.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 BEIJING GNU/LINUX USER GROUP CANARY (1/3) ==================================== Issued for July 2022. Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the digital signatures! Also, make sure the keys are correct! Signers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * biergaizi: 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D * persmule : 0xEDFFE248ECFACDE3C805906804A40D21DBB89B60 * vimacs : 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403 THREE DOCUMENTS IN TOTAL. You should verify all signatures from each of the maintainers, the next one is located at: * https://beijinglug.club/wiki/doku.php?id=blug-canary-2 It is possible that the signatures are not updated at the same time, but eventually all canary documents should be consistent, signed and updated by all current maintainers of Beijing GNU/Linux User Group in a short time. Statements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. All our infrastructure is in our control, the integrity of our entire system is sound. 2. We have not been compromised or suffered a recent data breach, to our best knowledge. 3. We have not disclosed any private encryption keys. 4. We have not been forced to modify our system to allow access or information leakage to a third party. 5. We haven't received any specific orders, requests or recommendations from any authorities, whether formal or informal. 6. We have not received any court orders, gag orders, or other similar orders from the government of the People's Republic of China. 7. We have not received any government subpoenas. 8. Our personal safety and security is not threatened. 9. To avoid security breaches and emphasize the clarity of the warrant canary documents, if a signer is temporarily unavailable, only existing signers in the "Signer" list SHALL sign a special placeholder notice (this notice itself SHOULD NOT be considered a valid canary document) until the signer becomes available again and signs the missed documents. A new signer SHOULD NOT sign a warrant canary document only due to the temporary unavailability of a existing signer. 10. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first three weeks of August 2022. Special note should be taken if no new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without plausible explanation. 11. Due to the ongoing security issues of OpenPGP keyservers, it makes signature verification an issue and somewhat a challenge. For completeness, complete procedures for canary verification is included here. Special Announcements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ None. Canary Verification Procedures ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. To verify biergaizi's signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x255211B2395A5A3E0E48A0F1FAD3EB05E88E8D6D. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. 2. To verify persmule's signature... a. Unfortunately, it's not possible yet. Recent attacks on OpenPGP key- servers have raised great security concerns within the community, as a countermeasure, persmule's new public key has been published to the https://keys.openpgp.org/ keyserver, but without a User-ID. Currently, it's impossible to import a OpenPGP public key without User-ID for a 3rd-party to verify the canary document signed by persmule. b. We are looking for a solution. But for now, you should check the canary documents signed by biergaizi and vimacs to decide the validity of the canary documents. This effectively reduced the number of signers to two people. It reduces the level of confidence, but currently there is no alternative option yet. c. Once the technical problem of using a public key without User-ID is resolved, you can check the previous signatures retroactively, and this would effectively restore the level of confidence. You can archive the documents to your own machine as soon as it's published to ensure no data tampering has occurred. 3. To verify vimacs' signature... a. Obtain the public key from any traditional OpenPGP Keyserver, such as https://keyserver.ubuntu.com, and import the public key. The fingerprint is 0x7079B481F04B5D8B65A0ECDEEA2DB82FE04A9403. b. Use the latest GnuPG in any operating system. Proof of Freshness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/rss.xml Rail strikers are lazy and selfish, say tourists stuck at Dover as network grinds to a halt Lilia Valutyte stabbing: Man arrested on suspicion of murder of nine-year-old girl Mega Greggs denied running 24-hours over crime fears Saturday morning UK news briefing: Today's top headlines from The Telegraph Nine-year-old stabbed to death in Boston, Lincolnshire while playing in street with little sister $ rsstail -1 -n5 -N -u https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml A Polish Priests War Against Abortion Focuses on Helping Single Mothers Francis Calls Abuse of Indigenous People in Canada a Genocide Gangs Advance on the Seat of Haitian Government Power: Haitians Are Hostages Live Updates: Ukraine Seeks Inquiry Into Killing of Dozens at Russian Prison Camp Heavy Rain Causes Deadly Flooding Across Iran $ date -R -u Sat, 30 Jul 2022 22:45:28 +0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEJVIRsjlaWj4OSKDx+tPrBeiOjW0FAmLltJQACgkQ+tPrBeiO jW3NcQ/9EkT62K6zbcbr5b6WMnpMVIDkSgOqoAPHaLilSY+VSm39++sLAEQgRdps 4MHjzD9NiVqo78yIxqX7SbBB7QvA1Ue3yfLxK8D291/fHEXuRET7RnJyVCK6oYTb F9wQ41aMe0n4TX3sdiCT1HFf1aPz+6VGEYzMTJEIXAiWsXk4WKAQ9Reiskn7535e THdFTrczQJXFmhWk5DyICxdireGu82Z/17iYZAhGxGpDZpqkiXP2K3YTWEZDukbb tD6D4ov8PZnoRDqClItHbozKBNsMImiMD/GXRqAnH3MTcBkqORLh2WwSkiKhAhkB 6sM35TDuduLZAR6KV4NYnP+NE7Vt+o5qwMjLcVTHKq/gxf0f5/2i1wXkw3RyDfqH ZpA3bCY7mMjXX4UnqW/5I/wzt+kAxbYkZVBMYtl5Iefd8Br5ZvoaOrFT/rAb7KAS rw6Y5sADNDK0I3ULXezpEL0vkouKxFz4sFSTC9QZENmwaej8bGApU0sADaAKOvI2 rIji0OkgkJrZAmnfvBeV9D4E7b1hQHG6dYFDtaHY4TLxaaR3l/DFWmsD0JxZ5lNa y8j2yMB9+dWueDhDXMWsIa/Fnklub1f/QbhWHOTA7q+65JQAs+KJBnFcbl2Y/K/v 0s2NvODbTyy8s00oephV1tUfa1Zt2HyII0LnM2rma/qJSNM+PPw= =qMTY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----